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The Prince knows that justice is the profitable capital of the kings and an act that brings them success. For it 
is justice that has made the states preserve and it is justice that builds provinces and it is justice that has made 
countries and men safe. So the Prince acts justly towards His subjects: to those who are close and distinct, 
present and absent. He investigates their wrongs, listens to their complaints and gives ear to the settlement of 
charges.1 
 
 This is an excerpt from sultan Qalāwūn’s memorandum to his son al-Malik al Ṣāliḥ on 
running the state’s affairs in his absence on a campaign. Qalāwūn emphasized the importance of 
“justice” in this memorandum, which reflects the extent to which the concept of justice and redress 
of wrongs was central to the Mamluks. There were different venues and forms of justice during the 
Mamluk period. Even though the work of al-Māwardī on maẓālim continued to be highly 
influential,2 the institution under the Mamluks often tended to diverge from his directives and 
follow other criteria.  
Maẓālim was one of these various venues of justice that existed under the Mamluks and 
underwent significant transformations. The objective of this thesis is to explore the political 
significance of the maẓālim institution during the Mamluks and to study maẓālim as a product of its 
period rather than strictly follow the provisions in al-Māwardī’s work. While most of the literature 
                                                
1 This excerpt is taken from one of the state documents that were reproduced by Nāṣir al-Dīn Ṣāfī ibn ʿAlī al-ʿAsqalānī 
who worked as a clerk in the chancery between 1270 and 1280 and wrote the biography of sultan Qalāwūn. Nāṣir al-
Dīn Ṣāfī Ibn Alī al-ʿAsqalānī, al- Faḍl al- Maʾthūr min sīrat al-Sulṭān al-Malik al-Manṣūr (Beirut: al-ʿAṣryya, 2019), 
126; Paulina Lewicka, “What a King Should Care About: Two Memoranda of the Mamluk Sultan on Running the 
State’s Affairs,” Studia Arabistyczne I Islamistyczne 6 (1998): 12-15. 
2 Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭānīyah wa-al-wilāyāt al-dīnīyah (Beirut: al-ʿAṣryya, 2019), 94-113.  
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on maẓālim concentrates on the legal and administrative aspects of the institution, this thesis will 
attempt to focus on the place of maẓālim in the Mamluk state by identifying how the institution was 
politically utilized, in the light of its specific context. This will be done by understanding how and 
why maẓālim functioned during crucial moments in Mamluk legal history. I shall focus on four 
main moments of change in the history of maẓālim. These are mainly the years 1262, 1353, 1387, 
and 1457. The first moment of change occurred in 1262. Baybar decided to establish a particular 
venue for maẓālim that was called the Palace of Justice (dār al-ʿadl) and restructure the institution.3 
The second moment of change was between 1352 and 1353, when the jurisdiction of the 
chamberlain (ḥājib) was expanded into new legal areas. This expansion led to the emergence of a 
new institiution of justice that was called the siyāsah courts.4 The third transformation that 
happened in the institution was in 1387 when Barqūq decided to move maẓālim from dār al-ʿadl to 
the Royal Stables (al-iṣṭabl al- sulṭānī) and changed maẓālim protocol.5 The final change was the 
justice offered by the purchased Mamluks (julbān), who started to offer an alternative form 
of maẓālim between 1456 and 1457.6  
This periodization is based on moments of change and not according to a ruler or dynasty. 
Although there was a degree of continuity, each period was marked by significant transformations 
that impacted the institution and the legal system. Therefore, each chapter will focus on moments of 
change and explore what triggered these significant developments. This thesis will also investigate 
the extent to which these key developments were informed by particular political, economic, and 
social conditions that impacted the institution’s functioning and had broader implications for the 
Mamluk legal system. 
                                                
3 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: Al Furqān 
Islamic Heritage Foundation, 2013), 3: 655. 
4 Ibid., 3: 712-718. 
5 Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh Ibn al-Furāt (Beirut: Maṭbaʿatal- Amīrkḥāniyyah, 1936), 9: 17.  
6 Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-zāhirah fī mulūk Miṣr wa-al-Qāhirah, (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-al-Wathāʼiq al-
Qawmiyya bi-al-Qāhirah, 2005), 16: 114. 
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 Maẓālim under the Mamluks was one of the main venues of justice. It is essential, therefore,  
to understand first how this institution developed throughout history to recognize how it functioned 
under the Mamluks. Al-Māwardī is considered the first to provide a theoretical framework for the 
institution, in the eleventh century, in his book al-Aḥkām al-sulṭānīyah wa-al-wilāyāt al-dīnīyah. 
According to al-Māwardī, maẓālim is the office responsible for equitably settling disputes between 
litigants.7 Al-Māwardī considers maẓālim the office responsible for judging cases that are related to 
any act of oppression committed by government officials, which includes but is not limited to unfair 
tax collection, property confiscation, and management of pensions and endowments. Furthermore, it 
is the office that is in charge of enforcing sharīʿah judgments and reviewing complaints about acts 
that harm public morals that the muḥtasib fails to deal with and ensuring that public worships are 
correctly performed.8 Under the Mamluks and mainly for the first ninety years, maẓālim focused on 
cases that involved abuses of power. Then, two transformations happened in the second half of the 
fourteenth century. The first was the expansion of the jurisdiction of maẓālim to include 
matrimonial and debt cases.9 The second was the emergence of a new form of maẓālim, which was 
led by the ḥājib and was called the siyāsah court.10 Starting in the second half of the fourteenth 
century, the ḥājib,who was responsible for settling disputes between the Mamluks based on the 
Yāsā,11passed judgements on people.12 Eventually, the jurisdiction of the ḥājib and other military 
officers overlapped with the sharīʿah courts.13 This thesis will explore whether al-Māwardī’s view, 
was implemented or if the political pressures under various sultans shaped the maẓālim in a 
different direction.  
                                                
7 Al- Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭānīyah wa-al-wilāyāt al-dīnīyah, 94.  
8 Ibid., 99-100. 
9 Yossef Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law: Siyāsah and Sharīʿah under the Mamluks,” Mamluk Studies 
Review 16, no. 1 (2012): 81.  
10Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʿshá fī ṣināʿat al-īnshā, ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Shams al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyah, 2000), 5: 423; al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭat ̣wa-al-āthār, 3:717. 
11 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭat ẉa-al-āthār,3: 717; Robert Irwin, “The Privatization of 
"Justice" under the Circassian Mamluks,” Mamluk Studies Review 6, no. 1 (2002): 70.  
12 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār,3 :318.  
13 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār, 3: 717; Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious  
Law,” 86.  
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 There is a consensus among scholars that maẓālim, as a judicial system, is more flexible and 
practical than the sharīʿah court, with regard to procedures and investigations; it accepts 
documentary evidence and relies more on witnesses.14 Based on al-Mawārdī’s theoretical 
framework for maẓālim, which remained the cornerstone of the institution throughout history,15 
there are significant dissimilarities between the office of maẓālim and sharīʿah. Since maẓālim is 
concentrated in the hands of political and not religious authorities, nāẓir al-maẓālim possesses more 
power to settle disputes, broader freedom to pass judgments, use intimidation and circumstantial 
evidence. He has more time than a sharīʿah qāḍī to review cases of doubt and the authority to 
impose reconciliation. Furthermore, nāẓir al-maẓālim can hear the testimony of an unqualified 
witness and ask him to take the oath if he doubts his intention. Finally, he could begin by calling for 
the witnesses and hearing their testimony before the plaintiff’s.16 
 Maẓālim, as we know it is the state’s prerogative. The concept of maẓālim emerged at the 
end of the CaliphʿAlī’s reign, and he is often regarded as the first to oversee maẓālim, but he did not 
create an independent office for it. With the rapid expansion of the Islamic empire, this sole 
jurisdiction that was used by ʿAlī became more structured. ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān was the first 
caliph to assign a specific day for the redress of wrongs; this was done under the supervision of the 
eminent qāḍī Abū Idrīs al-Awdī. ʿUmar b ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz was the first caliph to preside over 
maẓālim personally. Caliphs al-Mahdī, al-Hādī, al-Rashīd, al-Maʾmūn and al-Muhtadī followed the 
same tradition. According to Ibn Taymīyah, the Abbasids established maẓālim when they found that 
they had to judge between people, and they did not have enough knowledge about al-siyāsah al-
ʿādila.17 In that respect, the institution often fell under state authority and not the judiciary. The 
                                                
14 Maaike Van Berkel, “Abbasids Maẓālim between Theory and Practice,” Bulletin d'études Orientates 63 (2014): 240.  
15 Al-Māwardī is considered the first to provide a framework for the institution. His work clearly defines the institution, 
officials responsible for it and their traits. He also provides a brief history of the institution and its development. Then, 
he tries to focus on the practical side of the institution by identifying the type of cases that are brought before maẓālim, 
evidence and witnesses. Furthermore, his work highlights the role of nāẓir at maẓālim versus the qāḍī and the process of 
delegating maẓālim authority. Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭānīyah wa-al-wilāyāt al-dīnīyah, 94-113. 
16 Ibid., 100-101.  
17 Ibn Taymīyah, Majmūʻat fatāwá Ibn Taymīyah (Medina: Mujamʿ al-Malik Faḥd, 2004), 20: 392. 
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concept of maẓālim was not entirely novel, as it was present in pre-Islamic Arabia and was used to 
settle disputes between tribes.18 
 Eventually, maẓālim was found to be a useful tool and became an integral part of Islamic 
rule. Niẓām al-Mulk, in his book The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, maintains that an 
ideal ruler should hold sessions for the redress of wrongs twice per week. During these sessions, the 
ruler should directly deal with his subjects without an intermediary, and in some instances, he 
should receive written petitions.19 Hence, presiding over maẓālim was often considered a sign of 
power and sovereignty that was practiced by different dynasties.20 Rulers continually used it 
because they found that it was a useful way of asserting their authority. 
Framework 
 The Mamluks inherited the Ayyubids legal system and did not intend to introduce 
momentous modifications.21 In the course of my thesis, I will try to explore some of the features in 
the maẓālim that were shaped by Mamluk political conditions and ideology. The Mamluks had their 
distinct ruling ideology and political environment, which shaped and structured the legal system 
differently from their predecessor. Maẓālim was one of these legal institutions which were 
structured differently under the Mamluks. The literature on maẓālim tends to focus on the legal and 
administrative aspects of the institution. Therefore, it was essential for me to try to find out how 
maẓālim functioned as a part of a particular political narrative. The primary objective of this thesis 
is to explore the place of maẓālim in the Mamluk state by identifying how this institution was 
politically utilized and to what extent rulers used it to assert their power in different ways. On the 
basis of this objective, it was useful for me to adopt a periodization that corresponded to some of 
                                                
18 Ibid.,95. 
19 Niẓām al-Mulk, Siyāsatʹnāmah: The Book of Government or Rules for king: The Siyar al Muluk or Siyasat-nama of 
Nizam al-Mulk by Hubert Darke (London: Curzon, 2002), 14. 
20 When Aḥmad Ibn Ṭulūn broke away from the Abbasids caliphate, he held maẓālim which was considered a sign of 
independence. Jørgen Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State: Maẓālim under the Baḥrī Mamluks, 662/1264–
789/1387 (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1985), 8. 
21 Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 14. 
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the critical changes in this institution. I was able to identify four main moments of change: 1262, 
1353, 1387, and 1457. The reason behind this periodization is that, although there was a continuity, 
as each chapter will try to show, significant transformations marked each phase. The first moment 
of change was the restructuring of maẓālim and its institutionalization, which started in 1262 with 
the establishment of the first dār al-ʿadl. 22 Maẓālim also played a crucial role in the legal system 
during this period. The cases that were brought before Baybars in maẓālim triggered the 
appointment of the four chief qāḍīs in 1265.23 This innovation had further implications for the state. 
The quadruple legal system allowed the state to play an active role and indirectly intervene in the 
legal system; the state exploited the differences between the madhāhib, and this was reflected in 
maẓālim. 24 The second moment of transformation was the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib. 
Between 1352 and 1353, al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ Ṣālih b. Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (r. 1351-1354) ordered 
amīr Sayf al-Dīn Jurjī, the chamberlain, to settle a debt case that was brought before the sultan in 
dār al-ʿadl.25 Maẓālim legitimised the emergence of a new form of justice, which eventually 
developed an alternative jurisdiction to the sharīʿah courts. This new form of justice, which was 
derived from maẓālim, was known by the siyāsah court and was led primarily by the ḥājib.26 The 
third moment of change in the history of Mamluk maẓālim was under Sultan Barqūq. He tried to 
bring the institution closer under sultanic overview. He made maẓālim more accessible to the public 
by moving it from dār al-ʿadl to the Royal Stables in 1387.27 However, in the fifteenth century, the 
institution became less structured and decentralized. The last transformation in the maẓālim 
institution under the Mamluks was the justice offered by the purchased Mamluks (julbān). Between 
1456 and 1457, the julbān offered an alternative form of maẓālim. The sultan’s julbān offered a 
privatised form of justice through the dikak placed in front of their houses and received a sort of 
                                                
22 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār,3 :655. 
23 Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State, 127; Rapoport, “Legal Diversity in the Age of Taqlid: The Four Chief 
Qāḍīs Under the Mamluks,” Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 2 (2003): 210. 
24 Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” 77. 
25 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār, 3: 717; Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious  
Law,” 82-84.  
26 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār,3 :717-718.   
27 Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh Ibn al-Furāt, 9: 17.  
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extortion in return from plaintiffs.28 This led to the commercialization of justice. The redress of 
wrongs was no longer concentrated in the sultan’s hand or one of his subordinates as the ḥājib. It 
was shared with different Mamluk factions. Maẓālim sessions were held in multiple locations. 
These were crucial moments in Mamluk legal history, as Rapoport asserts, and, as this thesis will 
argue, in the history of maẓālim. This thesis will document these key developments, which 
impacted the institution, were informed by particular political, economic, and social conditions, and 
had broader implications for the legal system as a whole. 
The second objective of this thesis is to study maẓālim in relation to other forms of justice, 
which are mainly sharīʿah, siyāsah, and Yāsa. In theory and practice, the legal sphere was divided 
between two major powers, which were juristic doctrine and siyāsah authority. The former was 
controlled by the ulama, while the latter was concentrated in the hands of political authorities, who 
always wanted to have a greater say in judicial matters. Nevertheless, they wanted to maintain and 
enhance the legitimacy that they gained from the ulama. The religious and political establishments 
were aware that they could not govern without the existence of one of them. However, they 
sometimes competed over authority and jurisdiction.29 This perspective is vital when dealing with 
maẓālim because it was the venue where this complex relationship between both powers manifested 
itself. Furthermore, this approach helps in understanding why some forms of justice expanded or 
shrank. This is one of the focal points that this thesis will explore.  
The Sources Available to Study Mamluk Maẓālim 
Whereas the Mamluks created a very bureaucratic process for maẓālim, very few petitions survived, 
such as the documents that were obtained from the monastery of St. Catherine in Sinai.30 Even the 
surviving petitions have some limitations, as they all belong to the same place. The petitions are 
                                                
28 Robert Irwin, “The Privatization of Justice, “Mamluk Studies Review 6, no. 1 (2002): 68. 
29 Moreover, some jurists, such as Ibn Taymīyah tried to theorize the relationship between rulers and jurists. For Ibn 
Taymīyah, fiqh by default governed siyāsah, and it shaped the rules and the parameters of it. He called for al- siyāsah 
al- sharʿiyya which implied that siyāsah was limited and governed by sharīʿah and any siyāsah policy was accepted 
given that it did not come into conflict with shariʿah. Stilt, Islamic Law in Action, 32-33. 
30 S. M. Stern, “ Petitions from the Mamluk Period: Notes on the Mamluk Documents from Sinai,” Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 29, no. 2 (1996): 223-276. 
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almost the same, and they reflect similar problems. The decrees do not include the name of the 
officials who were involved, nor the venue of hearing the cases. Consequently, we cannot 
generalize from this data.31 In contrast with petitions, Mamluk chronicles provide more information 
about the cases, officials who were involved, and the venue of hearing or submitting petitions, a 
type of data that we cannot extract from the petitions of the monastery of St. Catherine.  
Together, these two significant sources reveal part of the institution in practice. Relevant to 
this discussion is the secondary literature and the type of information it reveals. Although maẓālim 
is an integral part of any research that deals with the Mamluk legal system, very few works are fully 
dedicated to the study of Mamluk maẓālim. “ Petitions from the Mamluk Period: Notes on the 
Mamluk Documents from Sinai,” by S. M. Stern and Secular Justice in an Islamic State: Maẓālim 
under the Baḥrī Mamluks, 662/1264–789/1387 by Jørgen Nielsen are two major sources worthy of 
attention. These two sources rely on documentary evidence and focus on the practical side of the 
institution. Stern has tried to compare the documents that were obtained from the monastery of St. 
Catharine to two leading handbooks which are Ṣubḥ al-aʿshá fī ṣināʿat al-īnshāʾ by al-Qalqashandī, 
and Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār, Dawlat al-mamālīk al-ulá, by al-ʿUmarī.32 His work 
reveals the administrative side of the institution. On the other hand, Jørgen Nielsen has depended on 
a broader range of sources, which are mainly chronicles, handbooks and surviving petitions.33 
Therefore, his work is considered more comprehensive than Stern’s, mainly because he focused on 
maẓālim from the rise of the Mamluks until the reign of sultan Barqūq. He concludes that maẓālim 
under the Mamluks was a “passive” institution; its proper functioning relied on the system. 
 While Stern and Nilsen, primarily, focused on maẓālim during the Baḥrī Mamluks, Albrecht 
Fuess provides an overview of Mamluk mazālim from the rise to the fall of the Sultanate in his 
article, “Ẓulm by Maẓālim? The Political Implications of the Use of Maẓālim Jurisdiction by the 
Mamluk Sultans.” This article provides a summary of the institution under the Mamluks listing the 
                                                
31 The petitions are all related to requesting protection against Bedouin raids, corrupted officials, unfair tax collection 
and issues related to the monastic waqfs. Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State, 38.  
32 Stern, “ Petitions from the Mamluk Period,” 223-276.   
33 Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State.  
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sultans who presided over maẓālim and the reasons behind various locations. Fuess highlights the 
role played by different sultans and their objective behind holding maẓālim sessions. He concludes 
that maẓālim was an integral part of legitimacy for various sultans. From his point of view, maẓālim 
was the place at which litigants expressed their complaints, but they did not necessarily receive just 
verdicts, and the sultan concentrated all the state’s affairs, including the judiciary, in his hands.34 
Finally, the article of Fumihiko Hasebe, “Sultan Barqūq and his Complaining in the Royal 
Stables,” is an important source that focuses on maẓālim under Barqūq. In this article, Hasebe 
argues that the movement of maẓālim from dār al-ʿadl to the Royal Stables had social and political 
implications. Sultan Barqūq wanted to project himself as a court of appeal against the shariʿah and 
siyāsah courts. This was guided by his motive to attract a new audience to maẓālim sessions, who 
were mainly residents of rural areas, and encourage them to complain about abuses of power. In 
Hasebe’s viewpoint, this movement was also intended to enhance his public image as a just ruler.35 
Methodology and Sources 
 Even though these sources provide extensive information about the institution and reveal the 
legal and administrative sides, there is still a lot that requires exploration of maẓālim as a part of a 
particular political narrative. Therefore, the primary objective of this thesis is to explore to what 
extent this institution was politically utilized. This will be done by focusing on the subjects of cases 
that were brought before maẓālim, identifying the officials involved in and the venue of the 
sessions, considering the political objectives of the regime and the social and economic conditions 
during each period. Then, it will try to determine to what extent these elements impacted the 
functioning of the institution and led to significant developments, which impacted other venues of 
justice.  
                                                
34 Albrecht Fuess, “Ẓulm by Maẓālim? The Political Implications of the Use of Maẓālim Jurisdiction by the Mamluk 
Sultans,” Mamluk Studies Review 13, no.1 (2009): 121-147. 
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This study will survey a broad range of sources, which are mainly chronicles, handbooks, 
biographies, and secondary literature. This thesis will primarily rest on chronicles as they record 
cases in detail and provide a background to the major political, economic, and social events. Al-
Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk and 
Ighāthat al-ummah bi-kashf al-ghummah by al- Maqrīzī, and al-Nujūm al-zāhirah fī mulūk Miṣr 
wa-al-Qāhirah by Ibn Taghrībirdī, and Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab by al-Nuwayrī. Then, it 
will compare three leading handbooks, which are al-Aḥkām al-sulṭānīyah wa-al-wilāyāt al-dīnīyah 
by al- Māwardī and Ṣubḥ al-aʿshá   fī ṣināʿat al-īnshāʾ by al-Qalqashandī, and Masālīk al-abṣār fī 
mamālik al-amṣār, Dawlat al-mamālīk al-Ulá by Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī to chronicles and try to 
highlight the differences between theory and practice. As for biographies, this thesis surveys Al-
Rawḍ al-Ẓāhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir by Ibn ʻAbd al-Ẓāhir and Tārīkh al-Malik al-
NāṣirMuhạmmad ibn Qalāwūn al-Sạliḥị̄ wa-awlādih by al-Shujāʿ and Al Fadl al-maʾṭhūr min sīrat 
al-Sulṭan al-Malik al-Manṣūr by Nāṣir al-Dīn Sāfī Ibn Alī al- ʿAsqalānī to complement the images 
that are portrayed in chronicles.  
Thesis Outline 
 Chapter one will primarily focus on maẓālim during the period of state formation between 
1260 and 1265 and how Baybars tried to utilize the institution politically. It will also highlight how 
maẓālim functioned for the first ninety years of Mamluk rule. This period is quite significant for 
several reasons. It was the period of setting up a new state. The regime was striving to establish its 
legitimacy. The Mamluks rise to power often entailed violence,36 so various sultans wanted to 
project a positive public image and gain public acceptance by appearing as just rulers. It was also a 
period of political instability; the state had to counter the external threats, which were posed by the 
Mongols and Crusaders.37 This chapter will try to propose some reasons for the development of a 
bureaucratic process, a special ceremony known as khidma, and a venue for maẓālim as dār al-ʿadl. 
                                                
36 Fuess, “Ẓulm by Maẓālim,” 124.  
37 Nasser O. Rabbat, “The Ideological Significance of the Dār al-ʿAdl in the Medieval Islamic Orient,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 1 (1995):19. 
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It will try to understand to what extent these sultans used maẓālim to respond to some of the 
challenges they encountered in this period, such as legitimization, and to what extent this impacted 
the institution's functioning. This chapter will also tackle the relationship between sultanic and 
religious authorities. This will be done by focusing on the role played by the sharīʿah qāḍīs during 
the sessions and studying the changes that took place in maẓālim in relation to other legal 
innovations such as the appointment of four chief qāḍīs in 1265. 
 Chapter two deals mainly with the expansion of the ḥājib jurisdiction between 1352 and 
1353. It will also tackle how maẓālim functioned under the descendants of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad 
between 1341 and 1382. The period under examination was marked by political instability and the 
beginning of the economic crisis. The weak rule of the Mamluk sultans was one of the main reasons 
behind the political instability. Twelve sultans came to the throne from the Qalāwūnids house 
between 1341 and 1382; eight out of them were minors who did not receive training and were 
brought up in the harem.38  The state was run by al-amīr al-kabīr and majlis al-mashūra, and the 
majority of the Qalāwūnids sultans played a nominal role.39 Furthermore, the economic crisis which 
started in 1348 weakened the position of the state. The most obvious reasons for the economic crisis 
were the black death and weak administration, which resulted in ineffective land management and 
abuse of power by governors, tax collectors, and military officials.40 This period was marked by one 
of the key developments in maẓālim history, which was the expansion of its jurisdiction over debt 
and matrimonial cases.41 Cases that were always dealt with by the Islamic judiciary and were 
judged constantly by qāḍīs and had explicit Qurʾānic  provisions were judged by the ḥājib. There 
were important repercussions. Youssef Rapoport argues, the primary objective of this expansion 
                                                
38 Amalia Levanoni, “The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 3 
(1994): 381. 
39 Ibid., 383.  
40 Amina Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protest in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria (Cairo: AUC Press, 2015), 
7. 
41Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār, 3 :712, 717; Rapoport, “Royal Justice and 
Religious  Law, 81. 
 
  17 
was to avoid the formalism of the sharīʿah court and guarantee access to justice.42 There could be 
other reasons for this transformation, such as the competition between religious and political 
authorities or between the sharīʿah and Yāsā. I will explore this thorny question further. The case 
that triggered this development was brought before a Ḥanafī judge who failed to deliver a just 
verdict because of the formalism of the sharīʿah law, which made debtors escape payment.43 Given 
the broadening of its competences, this innovation was marked by the expansion of the siyāsah 
courts between 1352-1353, which was led by the ḥājib and was followed by the appointment of 
muftī dār al-ʿadl in 1360.44 This chapter will try to understand the relationship between the 
expansion of the siyāsah courts and the economic and political conditions during this period. This 
expansion impacted not only maẓālim but also other venues of justice and the relationship between 
political authorities and religious authorities who could not approve such a step.  
 Chapter three focuses on maẓālim under the Circassian Mamluks, who faced similar 
economic challenges. However, under their rule, the sultan restored his authority and was able to 
dominate the political scene.45 This period is marked by the movement of maẓālim sessions from 
the magnificent venue dār al-ʿadl to the Royal stables by sultan Barqūq in 1387 and some changes 
in maẓālim protocol.46 This chapter will try to propose some reasons for these significant 
transformations that took place during this period. It will also try to look at these critical 
developments as part of the regime’s attempts to confront the economic crisis and restructure the 
state. The second part of this chapter deals with maẓālim in the fifteenth century. It was a very 
tough period on multiple levels. The prolonged economic decline was one of the main challenges 
that faced the state. Various sultans strived to improve the financial situation of the state, which was 
unattainable in this period.47 Although the social structure of the Mamluks, which capitalized on 
                                                
42 Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law, 75, 84. 
43 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār, 3: 386. 
44 Rapport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” 81-82, 84. 
45 John L. Meloy, “The Privatization of Protection: Extortion and the State in the Circassian Mamluk Period,” Journal 
of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 47, no. 2 (2004) 196.  
46 Hasebe, “Sultan Barqūq and his Complaining in the Royal Stables,” 316. 
47 Igarashi Daisuke, “The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāytbāy,” Mamluk Studies Review13, no. 1 (2009). 27-51.  
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factionalism, never changed throughout their rule, and the military elite often possessed power,48 
this issue intensified in the fifteenth century. The economic and financial situation of the state 
forced it to share power with different social groups. The state started selling some of the public 
offices, which were occupied by civilians to military officers in an attempt to compensate for the 
lost revenue and indirectly pay Mamluk amīrs, with the collapse of the iqṭāʿ system.49 One of the 
factions who gained power at the middle of the fifteenth century were the julbān, who directly 
interfered in the administration of justice. They offered a private form of justice through the dikkak, 
located in front of their households.50 It was considered an alternative form of maẓālim. In that 
sense, the administration of justice was decentralized, as Amina Elbendary points out.51 It was no 
longer an exclusive state activity, but different factions interfered in it. This was what Robert Irwin 
called “The privatization of justice.”52 This section aims to understand how the critical economic 
and political conditions of the state led to the commercialization of justice.  It will also try to 
highlight how different social groups interfered with the administration of justice. How did all these 
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49 Ibid., 1, 12.  
50 Fuess, “Ẓulm by Maẓālim,”140; Robert Irwin, “The Privatization of Justice,”69.  
51 Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans, 42.  
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Maẓālim during the period of (1260-1341) can be best understood in the context of the 
process of state formation under the early Mamluks. During the first few decades, they undertook 
several changes in the ruling institutions, including the maẓālim, which corresponded to the political 
scene and the early decades of their rule’s internal and external threats.  
 The Mamluks inherited this state from their masters the Ayyubids, mainly by claiming 
loyalty to al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb (r. 1240-1249). He was the one who formed a new 
military elite known of the Baḥrīa Mamluks; Baybars (r. 1260-1277) and Qālawūn (r.1279-1290) 
belonged to this faction.53 While the Mamluks in 1250 inherited an established state, the 
circumstances were different, which forced them to encounter external and internal threats. The 
Mamluks had to defend their borders against the Crusaders and Mongols, who posed a military and 
economic threat by dominating major trade routes.54 The Mamluks’ genealogy was also 
problematic, and they came from different racial and ethnic backgrounds.55 The social and political 
structure of the Mamluk regime was distinct; it capitalized on factionalism, which made violence 
ever present. Political legitimacy was granted to the victorious and powerful faction.56 These were 
                                                
53 Robert Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382 (Southern Illinois: 
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54 Northrup, “The Bahrī Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1390,” 248, 277.   
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all factors that fuelled disintegration rather than unity. Under these critical conditions, the Mamluks 
insisted on founding a state and gaining acceptance. They strived to build an empire that capitalised 
on various pillars. During this period, one of the main elements that they relied on was building and 
reshaping institutions in a way that consolidated their rule.  
 During the early period of state formation, mainly between 1260 and 1265, the Mamluks 
introduced measurable changes in some of the key institutions. One objective of these changes was 
to centralize their rule. They developed a hierarchical structure for the military more than their 
predecessors, the Ayyubids.57 The military was divided into three main groups: the Royal Mamluks, 
amīrs’ Mamluks and ḥalqa troops. The Royal Mamluks were considered the backbone of the army 
and had various ranks.58 Whereas during the Ayyubids the iqṭāʿ was hereditary, in this new system 
the rank of the Mamluk was what determined the size of  the iqṭāʿ that he received.59As part of 
centralisation, a close link was established between the military and the government; key offices in 
the administration were occupied by the Mamluks or supervised by them.60 Furthermore, an 
advanced  postal system was initiated, which served both the government and military; through this 
system, news reached Damascus from Cairo in four days.61 As for the judiciary,  in the beginning, 
the Mamluks maintained the same judicial system that was instituted by the Ayyubids. Then, in 
1265, Baybars decided to apply the quadruple legal system. There are multiple readings for this 
radical transformation, but the indubitable consequence was that by this system, the four legal 
schools relatively enjoyed an equal status. The Mamluks also enhanced and innovated the madrasa 
system, and this was done through the properties that they donated as endowments (awqāf),62 which 
allowed them to become more involved in religious life.63 The chancery was also one of the 
institutions that the Mamluks tried to restructure. It was expanded and restructured so as to become 
                                                
57 Northrup, “The Baḥrī Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1390,” 260.  
58 David Ayalon, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
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59 Sayyidah Fatima Sadeque, Baybars I of Egypt (Dacca: Oxford University, 1956), 70.  
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more hierarchical. One of the most important posts that they introduced was kātib al-sirr, who was 
considered the head of the chancery (ṣāḥib ḍīwān al-īnshāʾ); he was the confidential secretary of 
the sultan and one of the most influential personnel in the maẓālim institution.64 This office was 
occupied by civilians, who received a religious education, and was monopolised by certain families. 
 Maẓālim was also one of the key institutions that the Mamluks tried to reshape during the 
period of state formation. They established a particular venue and an elaborate bureaucratic process, 
which eventually made maẓālim become an integral part of the administration. While the primary 
objective of maẓālim was to redress wrongs committed by officials, the Mamluks tried to utilise the 
institution in a way that yielded more benefits to the regime. In this chapter, I will argue that the 
Mamluks politically utilised maẓālim during the period of state formation to consolidate their 
legitimacy. Historians have discussed this matter in several works that the Mamluks relied on the 
caliphate and projected themselves as the Islamic empire’s defenders through their wars with the 
Crusaders to consolidate their legitimacy.65 In that sense, they have relied on two leading 
institutions, which were the caliphate and military. I will argue that they used multiple ways to do 
this, such as the waqf foundation they used to support the ulama. Maẓālim could be added to these 
institutions and was one of the main pillars that the Mamluks capitalised on to consolidate their 
legitimacy and gain public acceptance during the period of state formation. This chapter will focus 
on the role played by Baybars in maẓālim because he is considered the real founder of the Mamluk 
sultanate, who laid the foundations of the state. Maẓālim was one of the institutions that were 
reshaped during this process. Qalāwūn and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad followed the same tradition that 
was initiated by Baybars and considered maẓālim an integral part of the administration and created 
a special venue for it. Baybars was able to politically utilise maẓālim to consolidate the legitimacy 
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of the regime. Baybars played an active role in maẓālim; this does not imply that he reviewed every 
single petition, but, at times, he delegated this authority, which was accepted according to the 
theory of al-Māwardī.66 Baybars was able to utilize the institution in multiple ways while preserving 
its primary objective, which was the redress of wrongs. There were moments when Baybars took 
advantage of the institution to magnify his role as a just ruler to gain public acceptance, and there 
were others when he used maẓālim to achieve specific political objectives such as the quadruple 
legal system. These were attempts that helped him project a positive public image and consolidate 
the legitimacy of the regime.  
 The idea that the Mamluks wanted to consolidate their legitimacy and gain public support 
remained a central ideology, especially in the early period of state formation. The victory of ʿAyn 
Jalut in 1260 was a turning point in the Mamluk history as it projected their supreme military 
power.67 Between 1261 and 1262, Baybars decided to recognise one of the members of the 
Abbasids family to reign as caliph in Egypt.68 Baybars tried to legitimise the Mamluk regime by 
reestablishing the caliphate, which was one of the foundations of an Islamic state. Robert Irwin 
asserts that Baybars also had another objective, which was to project the Mamluk system as pious 
and fair and eliminate any unfavourable memory that was attached to the regime.69 However, for 
Sherman Jackson, it was very challenging to eliminate the unfavourable image that was attached to 
the regime for three main reasons. Although the presence of the caliph was essential to provide 
legitimacy for the regime,70 in the viewpoint of Sherman Jackson, he remained an outsider, who 
was anonymous to the Egyptian population.71 Furthermore, people were scared of the Mamluks 
mainly because accession to the throne often entailed violence,72 including Baybars. Their slave 
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origin remained a stigma, which negatively impacted their legitimacy. If we consider all these 
factors, the desire of the Mamluk sultans to appear as just and ideal rulers becomes clearer. It also 
underscores how consolidating their relation with their subjects was key and was one of the means 
of achieving their objective.  
 As Linda Darling rightly notes, the Mamluks considered the idea of appearing as just rulers 
a main source of legitimacy. This urged them to strengthen their relationship with their 
subjects.73Maẓālim was one of the institutions that rendered Mamluks sultans the opportunity to 
project their justice to convey a positive public image and gain public support since the sultan was 
present in person to its sitting, which consolidated their legitimacy. This is particularly evident 
because of the nature of the institution and the way the Mamluk utilized it to achieve this political 
objective. Three main traits distinguish maẓālim during the Mamluks. The first was creating a 
particular venue for it.74 This was important because it provided a public space for petitioners to 
appear. The second was the considerable emphasis place on maẓālim as a public event, and litigants 
possibly saw the sultan in person. This emphasized his image as a just ruler. The third was the 
elaboration of its bureaucratic process. These innovations reflect how maẓālim was restructured and 
institutionalized under the Mamluks to serve their political objectives. 
Dār al-ʿadl 
 One of the main objectives of maẓālim according to al-Māwardī is to guarantee access to 
justice, especially when the qāḍī’s court failed to do so because of the strict rules of the sharīʿah or 
the defendant’s power or social position.75 Since it was one of the primary duties of the ruler to 
make sure that justice prevailed, he must offer the public the opportunity to complain about any 
unjust act in a broad sense and officials’ usurpation in particular.76 Therefore, the sultan had to 
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76 Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭānīyah wa-al-wilāyāt al-dīnīyah, 97; Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State, 1.  
 
  24 
make himself accessible to the public on fixed days and in specific locations.77 This what the 
Mamluk sultans did by creating a particular venue for maẓālim as dār al-ʿadl, which they were in 
attendance at on Mondays and Thursdays. According to Jørgen Nielsen, the building of dār al-ʿadl 
did not only mark the presence of an elaborate bureaucratic process and institution, as will be 
discussed,78 but it also highlighted the accessibility of the sultan, who was keen on solving the 
problems of his subjects, and by that, he supported his legitimacy.79 
 The Mamluks did not invent this; it was already before them. According to al-Maqrīzī, the 
first of these magnificent establishments were found by Nūr al-Dīn Zankī in Damascus in 1163. 
One of the indispensable traits of this building since its foundation was that it highlighted the 
accessibility of the sultan and projected his justice to the public. According to the sources, what 
triggered Nūr al-Dīn’s attention and made him establish a special venue for maẓālim as dār al-ʿadl 
was that he discovered that many people were complaining about abuses of power that were 
committed by the deputies of one of his most influential officials, Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh. In response 
to these complaints, Nūr al-Dīn decided to establish and hold maẓālim sessions twice per week in 
dār al-ʿadl in the presence of judges and jurists.80  Then, when the founder of the Ayyubid dynasty 
Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn attained to the throne, he followed the same tradition of his master and held maẓālim 
on Mondays and Thursdays in dār al-ʿadl.81 Probably the building itself acquired a significant place 
as it projected the justice of the sultan and correlated with powerful rulers, which encouraged later 
sultans to establish it. According to al-Maqrīzī, the second dār al-ʿadl was established by al-Ẓāhir 
Ghāzī in Aleppo, in 1189. The third was founded by al-Kāmil Muḥammad, in 1207, in Cairo.82 
Although Ayyubid sultans established dār al-ʿadl, they did not confine holding maẓālim sessions to 
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this location. As multiple sources reveal, maẓālim under the Ayyubids was often held in al-
Ṣāliḥiyya madrasa.83 Holding maẓālim in the al- Ṣāliḥyya madrasa under the Ayyubids is quite 
significant. It shows that under the Ayyubids maẓālim authority was not necessarily concentrated in 
the hands of political authorities but was delegated to the members of the religious establishment. In 
that respect, the sultan did not personally preside over maẓālim under the Ayyubids, but he 
delegated his authority to nāʾib dār al-ʿadl, who by virtue of the location belonged to the ulama 
class.84   
 Al-Ṣāliḥiyya madrasa remained the main venue for maẓālim, and even Aybak used it for 
holding maẓālim sessions until Baybars decided in 1262 to build a new dār al-ʿadl at the edge of 
Citadel of Cairo.85 Baybars was probably inspired by the legacy of the building and wanted to 
project his justice. His decision to establish dār al-ʿadl underlines several innovations that emerged 
under the Mamluks.  According to al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī,86 the sultan used to sit 
in his īwān or dār al-ʿadl on Mondays and Thursdays.87 According to al-Maqrīzī, over ninety years, 
three dār al-ʿadls were built. The first one was built by Baybars in 1262.88  In 1284, Qalāwūn 
destroyed Baybars’s dār al-ʿadl and built his own, which was known by al-īwān al- Manṣūrī. When 
his son al-Ashraf Khalīl attained to the throne, he renovated the building of his father.89 Then, al-
Nāṣir Muḥammad, in 1311, demolished the īwān that was built and renovated by his father and 
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brother. In 1333, he established a new one90 which, as al-Maqrīzī maintains, was one of the most 
magnificent Mamluk buildings.91 Under Baybars, Qalāwūn, and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, the main 
venue for maẓālim sessions was dār al-ʿadl.92 While maẓālim was the primary function of dār al-
ʿadl, the building was used for other purposes such as receiving public delegations, announcing 
appointments and carrying ceremonial events.93 In other words, its political identity was 
maintained. It was also used for receiving messengers from kings and reviewing the troops.94 
Historians tend to interpret the continuous building and demolishing of dār al-ʿadl as a sign of 
disintegration from the predecessor and an attempt by each sultan to leave his mark on 
administration and Cairo. Based on that, each sultan selected the most accessible location from his 
viewpoint.95 Despite the multiple interpretations that historians provide for this idea of establishing 
and renovating this building over this span, it is clear that dār al-ʿadl often played a very crucial 
role. The venue allowed the sultan to offer royal justice and highlighted his accessibility to the 
public. This enabled the sultan to project a positive public image and consolidate his legitimacy. In 
that respect, Yossef Rapoport maintains that dār al-ʿadl formalized the sultan’s jurisdiction and 
underscored his judicial authority.96 
Maẓālim as a Khidma 
 Dār al-ʿadl became the primary location for holding maẓālim sessions. Based on al-
Maqrīzī’s narrative this venue became the main site of khidma, which was the ceremony of 
maẓālim.97 The sultan usually went to dār al-ʿadl in a public procession know by mawkib to hold 
maẓālim sessions. While the practice of going to dār al-ʿadl in a mawkib was present since the 
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establishment of the institution, according to Jørgen Nielsen, the real innovation was the elaborate 
form of the khidma.98 It was extensively elaborated upon to emphasize hierarchy. Under the 
Mamluks, the mawkib of the sultan to dār al-ʿadl included different levels of officials. In this 
procession, the sultan was accompanied by the highest-ranking officials in the military, 
administration, and judiciary.99 The idea that dār al-ʿadl had other functions and all various levels 
of the officials accompanied the sultan in the khidma made maẓālim sessions a public event that 
reflected the real power of the state. Part of the Mamluks’ concern with maẓālim khidma was their 
eagerness to follow the same tradition of the founder of this venue Nūr al-Dīn Zankī, who tried to 
make use of this location as a place, which resembled justice and was backed up by the physical 
power of the state.100 This idea becomes more evident by considering the accounts of Ibn Faḍl Allāh 
al-ʿUmarī and al-Maqrīzī of maẓālim sessions under the Mamluks.101 According to both authors, in 
maẓālim sessions, the sultan used to sit on a chair that made his feet barely touch the ground and 
was placed beside the throne.102 On the right side of the sultan used to sit the four chief qāḍīs in the 
following order Shāfiʿī, Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī and beside them were the agent of the public 
treasury (wakīl bayt al-māl), and supervisor of the ḥisba of Cairo (nāẓir al-ḥisba).103 On the left 
side of the sultan sat the confidential secretary (kātib al-sirr) and vizier; if he were one of the men 
of the sword, he would stand at a distance from the holders of other offices. If he were vicegerent 
(nāʾib al-sālṭana), he would stand with the men of the pen.104 Behind the sultan from his right and 
left side two rows of the silāḥdāriyya, jamadāriyya and khāṣṣakiyya used to stand. These were the 
bearers of arms, keepers of the robes, and young mamluks who were brought up by the sultan. On 
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fifteen cubits from the sultan was the place of the elderly and senior amīrs, who were known by 
amīrs of consultation (umarāʾ al-mashūra).105 Behind them sat the high ranking amīrs and holders 
of the offices. The rest of the amīrs had to stand behind umarāʾal- mashūra. Then, the chamberlains 
(ḥujjāb) and the dawādāriyya would stand behind this circle that surrounded the sultan to collect 
maẓālim petitions (qiṣaṣ). Then, kātib al-sirr and the scribe of the bench (kātib al-dast) would start 
reading the petitions to the sultan.  
 These arrangements gave a visual dimension to the power structure. Interestingly enough, 
the sultan would refer to the qāḍīs the cases that involved sharīʿah.106 This reflected the symbiotic 
relationship that existed between the political authorities and religious authorities. This was 
considered the tradition until al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ b. Qalāwūn between 1352 and 1353 decided to 
delegate a case that fell under the sharīʿah jurisdiction to the ḥājib.  While if the complaint was 
against the amīrs of iqṭāʿāt, then the supervisor of the army (nāẓir al-jaysh) would read it to the 
sultan. If the sultan required consultation, he would review the case with the ḥājib and nāẓir al-
jaysh. The sultan would judge other cases based on what he saw. 
Despite the minor differences between the accounts of Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī and al-
Maqrīzī, they are quite significant for multiple reasons. They show the vast emphasis that the 
Mamluks placed on maẓālim as a public event, in which they projected the power of the state. 
Jurgen Paul argues that the concept of the khidma was quite significant throughout Islamic history. 
It was one of the means of projecting royal authority in different areas of the empire. It also allowed 
the ruler to establish a direct connection with his subjects and define his relationship with different 
regime members.107 The khidma was indicative and represented the military nature of the Mamluk 
state.108  Furthermore, according to al-Qalqashandī, the sultan had seven modes of appearance in 
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royal protocol. The first mode was his appearance in dār al-ʿadl to hold maẓālim sessions. This 
shows that maẓālim was considered a public event, and the appearance of the sultan in it was 
central. Al-Qalqashandī, also, maintains that on regular days the seating arrangement of the officials 
and the amīrs was very close to maẓālim sessions.109 The public appearance of the sultan in 
maẓālim sessions was central to the regime; eventually, it became an integral part of the 
administration. 
  The khidma reflected the proper functioning of the institution as it made maẓālim a public 
event. The regime tried to convey a message to the public that maẓālim functioned properly. It also 
highlighted the presence of just rulers and proper government. Jørgen Nielsen argues that the presence of an 
effective government would encourage the public to come and express their complaints and expect a fair 
judgment.110 Albrecht Fuess asserts that maẓālim allowed the public, who were on the receiving end, to 
complain about officials. Ideally, none was exempted from maẓālim; even the sultan himself could be 
complained about in maẓālim.111 This idea becomes more evident by considering one of the remarkable 
maẓālim cases, which made Baybars stand on an equal footing with his opponent, who was a soldier. The 
background of this incident, according to IbnʿAbd al- Ẓāhir, the biographer of Baybars, 112 was that one of 
the mamluks of the sultan died and was buried in a particular area. Baybars later found a need for a well in 
the same area, so he ordered its establishment.113 In 1262, the person who constructed the well claimed that 
the owner of it was one of the soldiers who was called Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd and requested compensation. 
This person acted aggressively and harmed the feelings of the poor about the use of this well. This news 
reached the sultan, so he called Maḥmūd, who came and demanded that his case would be judged based on 
the sharīʿah. The deputies of dār al-ʿadl sent a petition to the atābak and the sultan; they requested that this 
case be judged based on the sharīʿah. In response to this petition, the atābak requested the presence of the 
chief qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz, who was responsible for the management of waqfs and mosques. The sultan, 
atābak, chief qāḍī, and four jurists of the four madhāhib were all present on the assigned day for maẓālim. 
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The atābak asked the sultan to stand on an equal footing with his opponent without his sword.  The chief 
qāḍī asked both to sit down and explain the case from their point of view. It turned out that the sultan was 
right. The atābak asked the four jurists about their opinion, and they agreed that the sultan was the owner of 
the well. However, some of the materials belonged to Maḥmūd, so the sultan had to compensate him. In 
order not to harm the feelings of the poor, the sultan endowed a property that would fund the expenses of the 
well. After this session, the sultan granted the atābak a robe of honour for administering justice. The sultan 
also gifted robes of honours to the chief qāḍī and his opponent.114 This case is remarkable because it was one 
of the public moments when the sultan was subject to the law and did not utilize his authority as a sovereign. 
The relationship between religious law and non-religious law is quite significant in that case. 
While maẓālim is a state prerogative and technically fell under sultanic authority and not religious authority, 
the early Mamluk sultans referred to the qāḍīs the cases that involved the sharīʿah. It reflects the power 
structure until the death of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad and the symbiotic relationship between both authorities.  
 This case also shows the extent to which Mamluk sultans were keen on appearing as ideal 
and just rulers, who could stand on an equal footing with their opponents in front of the public. 
Baybars attempt to appear as an ideal rule is evident in the biography of IbnʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, who 
emphasised that Baybar was a just ruler.115 According to IbnʿAbd al-Ẓāhir Baybars’s justice 
manifested itself in two main ways: abolishing all the unfair taxes which were on land and 
properties, reviewing, investigating, and delivering just verdicts in maẓālim sessions.116 This shows 
the great emphasis placed on maẓālim as one of the sultan’s primary that projected his justice to the 
public. This is also one of the instances that shows how Baybars publicly projected his justice, 
which consolidated the legitimacy of the regime. IbnʿAbd al-Ẓāhir asserts that after this case, 
everyone was afraid to commit any wrong act. People believed that the sultan was subject to the 
law.117 Appearing as ideal and just rulers was very crucial for the Mamluk sultans. The involvement 
of members of the religious establishment, along with other officials in this case reflected proper 
governance, as it projected a desirable public image of the sultan and his regime. This was very 
                                                
114 IbnʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ al-ẓāhir fi sīrat al-malik al-Ẓāhir, 25-26; Fuess, “Ẓulm by Maẓālim,” 123.  
115 IbnʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ al-ẓāhir fi sīrat al-malik al-Ẓāhir, 25-26; Albrecht Fuess, “Ẓulm by Maẓālim,” 31.  
116 IbnʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ al-ẓāhir fi sīrat al-malik al-Ẓāhir, 22. 
117 Ibid., 25-26.  
 
  31 
crucial for Baybars in the period of state formation. This case also confirms the idea that Mamluk 
sultans used maẓālim and their presence in dār al-ʿadl to publicly announce that they adhered to the 
sharīʿah,118 which was an integral part of their legitimacy during this period.119 
Maẓālim as an Integral Part of the Administration 
 Presiding over maẓālim was often considered a sign of power and sovereignty. Jørgen 
Nielsen maintains that the power of a vizier was determined by two main factors, which were his 
authority over finances and maẓālim.120 The redress of grievance, as al-Māwardī asserted, was a 
practice that different rulers since the rise of Islam were keen on, which implies that it was an 
integral part of Islamic political theory.121 Mathieu Tillier maintains that maẓālim remained the 
direct intervention of the sultan in the administration of justice and an articulation of his 
legitimacy.122 In his viewpoint, maẓālim became one of the main “ pillars of the social game,”  
which strengthened the power of the ruler and made him control his entourage. Mathieu Tillier 
argues that rulers were very keen on the administration of justice to guarantee successful and stable 
reigns. Therefore, the redress of wrongs (radd al- maẓālim) was one of the most important concepts 
because it was a sign of sovereignty.123 On the other hand, Karl Stowasser asserts that the Mamluks 
projected themselves as the champions of Sunni Islam. They tried to restore classical Islamic 
institutions such as maẓālim and restructured them in a way that suited their needs and magnified 
their role as Sunni rulers. The Mamluks were always keen on highlighting this role and used every 
possible public occasion to project their supreme military and authority and deliver this message to 
their subjects and visitors.124 This idea becomes evident by considering maẓālim sessions as 
described by both Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī and al-Maqrīzī.125 The presence of military and civil 
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officials with all their levels along with members of the religious establishment in maẓālim sessions 
were quite significant. It was, in essence, a sign of sovereignty and an articulation of the legitimacy 
of the regime. It also made the sultan control his entourage, as Mathieu Tillier asserts.126 The 
essential elements of power that were members of the military, administration, and judiciary were 
all under the sultan’s control in maẓālim sessions.  
 These public sessions indicate that maẓālim became a highly structured institution, with 
clear protocols and personnel. Unlike their predecessor, the Mamluks developed an elaborate 
institution and considered it an integral part of their rule. They placed a huge emphasis on it as an 
integral part of rule and one of the primary duties of the sultan. In that sense, they tried to follow the 
theory of maẓālim as described by al-Mawardī to appear as just and ideal rulers. This idea is further 
confirmed by the memorandum that Qalāwūn prepared for his son al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ on how to run 
the state affairs during his absence on a campaign.127 In this memorandum, the redress of wrongs 
appears as one of the primary duties of the sultan. Qalāwūn highlighted the importance of justice, 
and he explicitly mentioned that it is the assets of kings that their success was closely tied to it. He 
also advised his son to act justly towards all his subjects, regardless of their relation to him; he had 
to investigate their cases, consider their complaints, and listen to their settlements. For Qalāwūn, the 
prince had to review cases in the presence of both parties. As maẓālim protocol dictates, Qalāwūn 
advised his son to consult appointed qāḍīs for cases of a religious nature.128 The same idea appears 
in the accounts of Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī, al-Maqrīzī and al-Qalqashandī, which also shows that 
maẓālim became an integral part of the administration and that consultation with qāḍīs was 
indispensable. Qalāwūn followed the same theory of al-Māwardī, which entailed that the ruler 
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should be present and accessible to the public. Al-Māwardī also considered the sharīʿah qāḍīs and 
jurists primary attendees in maẓālim sessions for consultation.129 This is quite significant as it 
reflects the symbiotic relationship between the sultan and members of the religious establishment in 
maẓālim. It may explain the extent to which referring to the ḥājib debt and matrimonial cases 
between 1352 and 1353 represented a dramatic transformation.130 Qāḍīs often acquired a special 
place in maẓālim sessions. This was not only confirmed by Qalāwūn’s memorandum but also by the 
seating arrangement in maẓālim sessions. It was a vivid representation of the power structure and 
the symbiotic relationship between both authorities.  
 The major variation between Qalāwūn’s view of maẓālim protocol and the previously 
mentioned authors is in his opinion about the cases that were not of a religious nature. Ibn Faḍl 
Allāh al-ʿUmarī, al-Maqrīzī and al-Qalqashandī tend to agree that the sultan had to consult the ḥājib 
and nāẓir al-jaysh in cases that involved the amīrs. On the other hand, Qalāwūn asserted that the 
prince should handle these cases, as they fell under the domain of his royal power, and he was the 
one who was able to establish the truth.131 In the second chapter of this memorandum, Qalāwūn 
advised his son to disregard the social status of the parties. In the third chapter of this memorandum, 
Qalāwūn asserted that even on his absence, the deputies of dār al-ʿadl had to be present in the 
assigned days. Officials who are customarily obliged to attend should review complaints and 
administer justice.132 This memorandum shows the extent to which maẓālim became an integral part 
of the administration and governance that even in the absence of the sultan it had to operate. This is 
further confirmed by the fact that the Qalāwūn dedicated three chapters to maẓālim, and the rest of 
the memorandum dealt with different military and administrative affairs of the state and amīrs.133 It 
also shows that the sultan had to deal with the cases personally, and this allowed him to project his 
justice to his subjects. Qalāwūn referred to the same concepts that Niẓām al-Mulk mentioned 
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about maẓālim.134 This reflects the extent to which the Mamluks considered maẓālim an integral 
part of Islamic government and an indispensable source of legitimacy and social order.  
While Qalāwūn’s memorandum reflects the extent to which maẓālim became integrated into 
the administration and one of the main principles of governance, the elaborate bureaucratic process 
for maẓālim, which is represented in the multiple channels for submitting petitions that the 
Mamluks developed underscores this key development. According to al-Qalqashandī, there were six 
methods for submitting maẓālim petitions. The first was presenting petitions directly to the sultan 
on ordinary days, and this was by giving it to kātib al-sirr, who would hand it to the chancery 
clerks.135 The second was submitting petitions to the head of the chancery (ṣāḥib dīwān al-īnshāʾ). 
There were two ways to present petitions through this channel, which varied based on the social 
class of the petitioner. If the petitioner was one of the Royal Mamluks or belonged to the elite class, 
he had to present his petition to ṣāḥib dīwān al-īnshāʾ ʾ directly; based on the petition’s nature, 
ṣāḥib dīwān al inshāʾ would determine whether this case would be sent to the sultan, or deal with it 
directly. If the petitioner was one of the public, he had to submit his case to one of the sectional 
heads of the chancery, who would review it and submit it to the saḥib dīwān al inshāʾ. He would 
review the case and determine its eligibility to be presented to the sultan.136 The third method was 
presenting petitions to the sultan at dār al-ʿadl. In this method, kātib al-sirr and kātib al-dast played 
a crucial role, as they were the ones who chose which petitions would be presented to the sultan, 
and they read it out.  They translated the sultan’s decision based on the sign that he gave with his 
head or hand and wrote it on the back of the petition. Then, it was returned to one of the chancery 
clerks.137 The fourth method was presenting petitions to (nāʾib al kāfīl), who would assign the task 
of reading the petition to kātib al-dast, who had to record his order and refine the petition. Then, the 
petition was carried to kātib al-sirr, who would submit it to one of the chancery clerks.138 
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Presenting petitions to the atābek or al-amīr al-kabīr was the fifth method. According to al-
Qalqashandī, this often happened when the sultan was a minor.139 Katīb al-dast played a crucial 
role, as he was the one who judged clear matters such as enforcing rights and presented to the 
atābek only the debatable issues.140 The last channel was presenting petitions to the dawādār, who 
usually carried a message from the sultan and informed kātib al-sirr the decision of the sultan 
regarding a specific case.141 It is important to note that al-Māwardī’s theory and Qalāwūn’s 
memorandum highlight the significance of the participation of the qāḍīs in the decision process of 
maẓālim cases. However, the bureaucratic process does not confirm this. It appears that qāḍīs 
played a crucial role in the public maẓālim sessions only. They did not participate in the 
bureaucratic process. In that sense, the regime used qāḍīs to project a positive public image by 
showing that they delivered just verdicts that complied with the sharīʿah.  
 The various channels for submitting maẓālim petitions, which are presented by al-
Qalqashandī, reveal the elaborate bureaucratic process that the Mamluks developed. The multiple 
channels that were noted by al-Qalqashandī uncover the power that some of the civilian officials 
acquired, such as kātib al-sirr and kātib al-dast.142 They were the personnel who decided to deal 
with a case or referred it to the sultan or high officials. One should not ignore that the way they read 
the petitions and how they translated the sultan’s decision could have impacted the judgment, 
though they took an oath that they should not deliver unintended meanings.143 Since many sultans 
                                                
139 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʿshá fī ṣināʿat al-īnshāʾ, 6: 198. However, this contradicts with St. Catherine petitions 
which were reviewed by the atābak Fāris al-Dīn Aqtāy al-Sāliḥī al-Najmī during the reign of Baybars. S. M. Stern, 
“Petitions from the Mamluk Period,” 244. 
140 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʿshá fī ṣināʿat al-īnshāʾ, 6: 198-199; Nielsen Secular Justice in an Islamic State, 68.  
141 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʿshá fī ṣināʿat al-īnshāʾ, 6: 199; Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State,70. 
142 According to Jørgen Nielsen, kātib al-sirr played the same role as the vizier during the Abbasids. He was the 
connecting channel between the ruler and the public. kātib al-sirr was one of the most vital personnel because he was 
the one responsible for handling maẓālim petitions. This post was monopolized by certain families Banū al-
ʿUmarī.They were educated civilians, who received religious training and occupied a social status which was very close 
to the ulama.  Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State, 136-138.  
143 Tāj al-Dīn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʻAlī Subkī, in his book Muʻīd al-niʻam wa-mubīd al-niqam asserts that kātib al-sirr 
was responsible for signing instead of the sultan, and he knew all his secrets. He was also responsible for signing the 
appointments and dismissal decrees of officials. He was the one responsible for presenting maẓālim petitions to the 
sultan and clarifying cases for the sultan until he understood the issue. In al-Subki’s viewpoint, if the sultan delivered an 
unfair judgment, kātib al-sirr was the one to be blamed, as he did not clarify the matter to the sultan. Tāj al-Dīn ʻAbd 
al-Wahhāb ibn ʻAlī Subkī, Muʻīd al-niʻam wa-mubīd al-niqam (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1993), 30; Nielsen, Secular 
Justice in an Islamic State, 70-71. 
 
  36 
found it hard to understand petitions, as they did not know Arabic,144 the presence of kātib al-sirr 
was vital; he was the personnel reading and clarifying the petition to the sultan.145 This also reflects 
how the chancery and maẓālim were restructured and reveals the close link that was established 
between these two institutions. The methods of presenting petitions and the procedures uncover the 
bureaucratic process. They also reveal that though in theory petitions should be submitted to the 
sultan, the norm was that different officials dealt with petitions based on their content.146 While in 
theory and according to Qalāwūn’s memorandum, qāḍīs should participate in this process, the 
bureaucratic process that the Mamluks developed gave a higher authority to the military officials 
and chancery personnel.  
Institutionalization 
 The idea that maẓālim became an integral part of the administration calls attention to 
institutionalization. This argument is based on the fact that the elaborate bureaucratic process that 
the Mamluks developed was what defined maẓālim as an institution.147 The Mamluks tried to 
institutionalize maẓālim by creating a very detailed bureaucratic process and special venue for it, 
which reflected their concern for the redress of wrongs and making it one of the main principles of 
governance as Qalāwūn asserts in his memorandum. The question is, why did the Mamluks attempt 
to institutionalize maẓālim, by making it an integral part of the administration? There are multiple 
reasons for this, some of which can be attributed to the institution in general. The Mamluks found 
that it could serve their political objectives in the period of state formation. While the integration of 
maẓālim in the administration was a sign of sovereignty and articulation of the regime’s legitimacy, 
it allowed the sultan to directly interfere in the administration of justice and impose policies that 
yielded benefits to the regime and, more importantly, without being viewed as violating the 
sharīʿah.  
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The following section will focus on maẓālim in a specific moment, which is 1265. This 
period is considered one of the landmarks in the Mamluk legal history. Baybars decided to appoint 
four chief qāḍīs, in response to complaints that were brought before maẓālim. This section will try 
to highlight how maẓālim was politically utilised to serve broader objectives of the regime, which 
were all related to consolidating their legitimacy and projecting a positive public image.   
 In general, maẓālim was often the way through which authorities interfered in the 
administration of justice. In the viewpoint of Albrecht Fuess, the institution developed when rulers 
no longer played a dual role and were forced to delegate their judicial authority to appointed 
qāḍīs.148 According to Joseph Schacht, in theory, the qāḍī ’s office was an independent body that 
could be a rival to political authorities, mainly rulers. In practice, however, matters were 
dramatically different as qāḍīs had to refer to political authorities to enforce their judgments, 
especially in criminal and fiscal matters.149 As Jonathan Berkey asserts, Mamluk sultans also 
indirectly controlled the legal system by appointing and dismissing qāḍīs and interfering in the 
application of the law.150 It is important to note that maẓālim was one of the means through which 
the sultan directly exercised an extraordinary judicial authority. Maẓālim is often viewed, and as the 
theory of al-Māwardī suggests and various contemporary historians assert, a “ superior justice” that 
is concentrated in the hands of the ruler who delegated his judicial power to the qāḍī.151 According 
to Wael Hallaq, maẓālim allowed the ruler to restore his judicial authority, which was delegated to 
the qāḍī at any point.152 In that respect,  maẓālim could be viewed as the institution that justified the 
interference of the ruler in the administration of justice.  This was an essential element for the 
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Mamluks, who wanted to project a positive public image. Consequently, they tried to find grounds 
for their actions and avoid any deeds that would harm this portrayal.  
 Historians have agreed that maẓālim played a crucial role in the of appointment of the four 
chief qāḍīs. Jørgen Nielsen asserts that the inheritance case of the heirs of al-Nāṣir, one of the 
Mamluk amīrs, triggered the appointment of the four chief qāḍīs. In his viewpoint, this general case 
impacted the state structure. 153 On the other hand, Sherman Jackson maintains that according to al-
Maqrīzī the complaints that the sultan received against the Shāfiʿī chief qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz from 
various amīrs, including amīr Jamāl al-Dīn Aydughdī, triggered the appointment of the four chief 
qāḍīs.154 The background of the incident, according to al-Maqrīzī, was that while the sultan was 
presiding over maẓālim in dār al-ʿadl at the end of 1265, more than one case was brought before 
him, and they were all against the chief qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz. The first case was by the heirs al-
Nāṣir. They complained that after they purchased the mansion of the chief judge Badr al Dīn al- 
Sinjārī, in his life, his heirs claimed that this property was a waqf. This case was a point of conflict 
between amīr Jamāl al-Dīn Aydughdī and Ibn bint al-Aʿazz. Amir Jamāl al-Din was often against 
qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz’s polices due to the rigidity of his judgments. The judgment of qāḍī Ibn bint 
al-Aʿazz was that if the waqf was confirmed, the heirs had to return the money to the buyers. The 
sultan interrupted him by asking about the position of the heirs of al-Nāṣir, if they were not able to 
pay.  The answer of Ibn bint al-Aʿazz was that “The waqf is confirmed… the buyers receive 
nothing.”155 Based on al-Maqrīzī’s narrative, it was clear that the answer of Ibn bint al-Aʿazz 
dissatisfied the sultan.  Then, another case was brought before Baybars; one of the messengers of 
the amīr of Medina complained that Ibn bint al-Aʿazz refused to give him the allocated money for 
the waqf that was under his control. In this case, qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz overruled the orders of 
Baybars, and when he was asked about the reason behind this action, he justified his deed by 
claiming that he could not give the money to someone he did not know. In the viewpoint of Ibn bint 
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al-Aʿazz, the money had to be given to someone he trusted his faith. Then, one of the amīrs 
complained about qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz and said that he refused to consider his testimony without 
a valid reason. When Aydughdī asked qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz about his rationale, he argued that he 
had to test the moral uprightness of this person.156 However, it was clear that qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz 
refused his testimony because of his madhhab. Then, amīr Aydughdī suggested that in order to 
solve this constant struggle, the sultan could appointment four chief qāḍīs, one from each madhhab. 
Baybars considered the suggestion of the amīr; on the following Monday, he appointed four chief 
qāḍīs. Ibn bint al-Aʿazz remained the chief qāḍī of the Shāfiʿī madhhab and retained exclusive 
jurisdiction over some issues, which pertained to public treasury and orphans properties’.157  
The establishment of the quadruple legal system could be viewed as one of the instances 
when maẓālim was politically utilized. The complaints that were brought before the sultan on one 
day in dār al-ʿadl did not only push the sultan to impose this policy, but more importantly, it 
justified his decision as the cases involved both members of the regime and ordinary subjects. The 
cases that were brought before the sultan on this day negatively impacted the interest of the public 
and political elites. The petitions were all complaints against the chief qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz and 
his insistence on applying very strict rulings and his rejection of the rulings that were not in 
accordance with the Shāfiʿī madhhab.158  
 Baybars's decision to appoint four chief qāḍīs, in 1265, did not come suddenly; we can find 
roots for this policy two years earlier. According to qāḍī Muḥyi al-Din Ibn ʿAbd al- Ẓāhir, the 
biographer of Baybars, in 1262 Baybars realized that the population of Cairo increased, and it was 
the capital of the empire. Since all the jurists from different madhāhib were gathered in it, he 
ordered the appointment of three deputies for the chief qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz to accommodate the 
needs of the growing population. He appointed Ḥanafī and Mālikī deputies but did not appoint a 
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Ḥanbalī as they were not too many, but he opened a registrar for them.159 Interestingly enough, 
Baybars decided to take this decision in the same year that he ordered the construction of dār al-
ʿadl at the foot of the citadel.160 We can consider that the appointment of the deputies and the 
establishment of dār al-ʿadl set the stage for the measurable legal reform that was introduced in 
1265, which marked the sultan’s direct interference in the administration of justice. According to 
Yossef Rapoport, dār al-ʿadl that was established by Baybars was a significant part of his judicial 
reform, which had a crucial impact on the Mamluk legal system. From his point of view, the 
establishment of dār al-ʿadl and application of the quadruple system could be viewed as two vital 
developments that highlighted the involvement of the sultan in the administration of justice.161 
 Another interpretation that Yossef Rapoport and Ido Shahar provide is that Baybars wanted 
to accommodate growing population’s needs and create a more flexible and predictable system.162 
Ibn bint al-Aʿazz refused to comply with the rulings of the other three madhāhib,163 as the above 
cases reveal. It is evident that he ignored the opinions of his non-Shāfiʿī deputies.164 This created a 
pressing need for the appointment of four chief qāḍīs. For Jørgen Nielsen, the way the cases were 
brought before Baybars in maẓālim suggests that Baybars was waiting for the chance to diminish 
the power of Ibn bint al-Aʿazz. In his viewpoint, Baybars wanted to weaken the position of the 
Shāfiʿī madhhab and to promote the Ḥanafī madhhab that the Mamluks adhered to.165 Sherman 
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Jackson suggests an alternative scenario that triggered Baybars decision, which was the 
dissatisfaction of the jurists of the other three madhāhib. Baybars did not want a conflict to arouse 
between the ulama, who were one of the most important groups of the society.166 Consequently, the 
sultan had to choose either to recognise the four schools or dismiss Ibn bint al-Aʿazz from his 
position.167 It was a critical moment seeing that Baybars was still trying to consolidate his 
legitimacy and gain public support.168Amalia Levanoni agrees with Sherman Jackson that Baybars 
wanted to eliminate the unfavorable image of the Mamluk, which was portrayed for ten years, as 
the rise of the Mamluks often entailed violence.169  Consequently, people lacked the sense of the 
state with a lack of continuity and legitimacy, and this was what motivated Baybars to appoint four 
chief qāḍīs.170 
 While the views about reasons behind the appointment of the four chief qāḍīs are 
controversial, it appears that maẓālim played a crucial role. It was politically utilized to achieve a 
particular political objective. This issue becomes more apparent by looking at the implications of 
the appointment of four chief qāḍīs on the public and state levels. On the public level, this system 
offered flexibility and predictability for litigants, which as  IbnʿAbd al-Ẓāhir maintains, was 
essential to accommodate the growing social needs of the population.171 Furthermore, in the view of  
Yossef Rapoport, the quadruple legal system overcame the rigidity that was created by the shift in 
Islamic jurisprudence from ijtihād to taqlīd.172 Occasionally, the Shāfiʿi madhhab failed to 
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accommodate some of the major issues that were related to stipulations in a marriage contracts, 
marriage of minor orphans, and  declaration of bankruptcy to avoid paying. The rigidity of the law 
increased not only because of the Shāfiʿī madhhab but due to the shift from ijtihād to taqlīd. Thus, 
Yossef Rapoport agrees with Kristen Stilt and Ido Shahar that the quadruple legal system was 
essential to decrease the rigidity of the law and to avoid the limitations of a single madhhab.173 This 
was a shift that benefited different segments of the society.   
 On the state level, the quadruple system allowed the state to play a very active role and 
indirectly intervene in the legal system. The state exploited the differences between the 
madhāhib.174Although the Shāfiʿī judges retained exclusive jurisdiction over some issues which 
were related to public treasury and orphan’s properties’,175 the four Sunni schools relatively enjoyed 
equal status. One of the vital implications of this system, as Jonathan Berkey asserts, was that 
Cairo, which was the capital of the Mamluk sultanate, became the center of Sunni Islam and 
culture. This complimented one of the broader strategies of the Mamluk regime, as they projected 
themselves as champions of Sunni Islam.176 
 Despite the multiple readings that historians provide for the appointment of the four chief 
qāḍīs and its implications, one of the objectives of this radical transformation remains political, and 
it consolidated the legitimacy of the Mamluks. Maẓālim was one of the means through which this 
political objective was achieved. This incident also represents one of the instances when maẓālim 
was used as a “superior justice.”  Baybars used the judicial authority that maẓālim granted to him 
and directly interfered in the administration of justice and introduced one of the legal innovations 
that continued to form the basis for the Mamluk legal system. This is even clear from al-Maqrīzī’s 
narrative; he asserts that due to the number of complaints that the sultan received against Ibn bint 
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al-Aʿazz, “it was agreed that the sultan would sit in dār al-ʿadl on Monday.” 177 This implies that 
the Baybars was planning to appoint four chief qāḍīs. However, probably, he could only apply this 
through the channel of maẓālim and its “superior justice” that enabled him to directly interfere in 
the administration of the justice, without appearing as violating sharīʿah, something the Mamluks 
wanted to avoid, especially in the period of state formation.  This would have harmed their 
legitimacy, which they were trying to consolidate by multiple means, one of which was by 
projecting themselves as the defenders of Sunni Islam.178 
 The first decades of the Mamluk sultanate were quite challenging due to the various threats 
that they had to encounter. One of the primary objectives of the regime was to set up a state that 
capitalized on various institutions to consolidate their legitimacy. Maẓālim was one of the leading 
institutions that the Mamluk relied on to achieve this political objective. While preserving the 
primary objective of the institution, which is the redress of wrongs, Mamluk sultans politically 
utilized the institution to magnify their role as just rulers and achieve specific objectives such as the 
quadruple legal system. In that respect, maẓālim could be considered one of the institutions that 
projected a positive public image of Mamluk sultans and allowed them to interfere in the 
administration of justice without harming their portrayal, which was a cornerstone in their 
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3 






 The previous chapter looked at maẓālim during the period of state formation, mainly 
between 1260 to 1341. Three main traits distinguished Mamluk maẓālim during this period; these 
were the creation of a particular venue, the considerable emphasis that was placed on maẓālim as a 
public event, and the elaborate bureaucratic process that was developed. These innovations 
reflected the place of maẓālim in the Mamluk state and how it became an integral part of the 
administration, which calls attention to institutionalization. The reasons behind institutionalization 
could be that the Mamluks tried to utilize the institution politically. Maẓālim allowed Mamluk 
sultans to offer royal justice, highlighted their accessibility to the public, allowed them to impose 
policies that yielded benefits to the regime. Through maẓālim, Mamluk sultans were able to 
consolidate their legitimacy, which was one of their primary objectives during this period. 
Context  
 The Mamluks expected the fourteenth century to be a period of stability and prosperity with 
the end of the Crusaders and the Mongol invasions, as the military and economic threats that were 
posed by these two dominant powers were eliminated.179 However, the state entered a new phase 
with the death of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad in 1341. This new phase emerged with its distinct internal 
political, economic, and social challenges. After the death of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, the state entered 
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a new phase of political instability with the weak rule of the Qalāwūnid s, which was accompanied 
by economic and social challenges.180Amalia Levanoni and Linda Northrup agree that a gradual 
deterioration occurred starting the third reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (r. 1310-1341). According to 
Amalia Levanoni and Linda Northrup, the military and economic reforms that al-Nāṣir Muḥammad 
introduced were the main reasons behind the decline of the Baḥrī Mamluks;181 the impact of these 
reforms manifested themselves after his death. Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad altered the social structure of 
the Mamluk regime by allowing the recruitment of non-Mamluks and sons of Mamluk elites (awlād 
al-nās) to senior military positions. His advancement strategy was different from his predecessors; 
it was based on gifts and marriage alliances more than performance and loyalty to the household.182 
The impact of these reforms led to the increase of the financial demands of the amīrs. this forced al-
Nāṣir and his successors to distribute iqṭāʿāt in a way that pleased the amīrs and consumed the 
resources of the state.183 
 The second half of the fourteenth century was a period of economic and social crises, and 
this issue intensified with the emergence of the bubonic plague. It was one of the devastating events 
in Egypt and Syria; it started in 1347, and its peak was between 1348 and 1349.184 It was a 
catastrophic period for the sultanate, as it was already experiencing famine.185 The very high 
mortality rates had economic and social drawbacks; the plague’s recurrent waves affected the army 
and the public.186 The plague directly contributed to the economic crisis because it impacted the 
workforce, mainly peasants, who were responsible for agricultural production. Since Egypt was an 
agrarian society and land tax was one of the primary sources of revenue, the plague’s impact was 
                                                
180 Ibid., 253. 
181 Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History, 1-2; Northrup, “The Baḥrī Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1390,” 253.  
182 Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History, 33, 40, 42, 46; Linda Northrup, “The Baḥrī Mamluk Sultanate, 
1250–1390,” 262, 287.  
183 Northrup, “The Baḥrī Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1390,”263; Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History, 68-69. 
184 Stilt, Islamic Law in Action, 21; Northrup, “The Baḥrī Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1390,” 287. 
185 Northrup, “The Baḥrī Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1390,” 287. 
186 Ibid., 253. 
 
  46 
devastating on the economy and the army, as the state failed to buy new recruiters to replace those 
who died.187 
 The Mamluk state suffered not only from chronic economic problems during this period but 
also from political instability. The struggle between factional powers intensified under the 
Qalāwūnid rule, and this was one of the many factors that created instability.188 Between 1341 and 
1382, twelve sultans came from the Qalāwūnid house; eight of them were minors, who did not 
receive military training and were brought up in the women’s quarter (ḥarīm). Jo Van Steenberg 
and Frederic Bauden argue that the Qalāwūnid s were weak characters, who followed the orders of 
their officials, and their presence on the throne was a matter of convenience for the Mamluk 
oligarchy.189 In the middle of the fourteenth century, accession of the Qalāwūnids to the throne was 
based on the support of the dominant faction; their guarantee that this sultan would secure their 
benefits informed their choice.190 The sultan gradually became a nominal figure, and the real 
authority was concentrated in the hands of the Mamluks. When al- Muẓaffar Ḥājjī (r. 1346-1347) 
was overthrown in 1347, the treasury was found empty. This created a pressing need for the 
formation of majlis al-mashūra; this counsel tried to control the state’s financial resources and 
resolve the economic crisis.191 In 1347, majlis al-mashūra diminished the power that the sultan had 
over the treasury and made him receive an allowance. The distribution of iqṭāʿ and promotions of 
the mamluks, which were one of the primary duties of the sultan, were transferred to majlis al- 
mashūra.192 Some sultans as al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ ibn Qalāwūn (r.1351- 1354) and al-Nāsīr Ḥassan (r. 
1354-1361), but majlis al-mashūra hindered them.193 Eventually, real power was concentrated in 
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the hands of the grand amīr and his faction and not the sultan; this set the stage for Barqūq to attain 
the throne in 1382.194 
 As various changes took place in the economic, social, and political environments in the 
second half of the fourteenth century, major transformations occurred in some vital institutions such 
as maẓālim. This was a time of change in maẓālim. New positions appeared, and there was a 
struggle over jurisdiction between the political and religious establishments. These significant 
changes were marked by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the chamberlain (ḥājib) between 1352 
and 1353 and were followed by the introduction of the post of muftī dār al-ʿadl in 1360.195 One of 
the focal issues pertaining to the study of this innovation is that some of the key terms are defined in 
various ways; to avoid confusion, I will clarify the meanings and implications of some of the 
fundamental terms in this chapter. The ḥājib is usually translated as the chamberlain; the term also 
applied to doorkeepers, military officers, and governors. In the Mamluk sultanate, the ḥājib played 
a crucial role; he was a slave soldier, who held the rank of “commander of a thousand.” According 
to al- Maqrīzī, he was the second after nāʾib al-sālṭana and replaced him during his absence.196 He 
was primarily responsible for settling disputes between the Mamluks. It is often believed that the 
ḥājib used the Yāsā to settle disputes between the Mamluks. The Yāsā is considered the legal law of 
Genghis Khan that he developed in 1206 to declare his supremacy over the Mongol tribes.197 The 
role of the chief ḥājib expanded in the middle of the fourteenth century to hear maẓālim petitions 
and other legal cases in a particular form of justice that was known by the siyāsah courts. Mamluk 
sultans initially led these courts; then, in the middle of the fourteenth century, Mamluk sultans 
decided to delegate this authority to the chief ḥājib.198 The chief ḥājib employed the siyāsah 
authority in his court. Siyāsah is the discretionary authority of the sovereign and his subordinates 
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that was exercised outside the realm of the sharīʿah.199 Theoretically, it allowed the ruler to apply 
and complement the sharīʿah. In practice, it offered him the opportunity to legislate and regulate 
laws.200 The siyāsah is the administrative justice that can be exercised by the sultan or his political 
subordinates. The maẓālim is one of the applications of the siyāsah.201 Mathieu Tillier agrees with 
Robert Irwin and Jørgen Nielsen that maẓālim during the Mamluks overlapped with siyāsah and 
was considered an integral part of it; in practice, maẓālim was regarded as a distinct form of 
siyāsah. This correlation between maẓālim and siyāsah authority became more apparent with the 
expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib over the population.202 In that respect, this chapter’s 
objective is to unpack the various implications of these fundamental transformation, with particular 
emphasis on their relationship to maẓālim in the middle of the fourteenth century. As for muftī dār 
al-ʿadl, his primary role was to give legal advice to the sultan or other military officials during 
maẓālim sessions.203 This office was introduced in the middle of the fourteenth century after the 
expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction around 1360. It is essential to highlight that all of these 
transformations reflect complexities and overlapping. They also suggest a continual change in some 
of these key positions and their functions, which shows that institutions were constantly changing.  
 The literature on the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib is centered around the idea 
that the ḥājib passed judgments over the population; the secondary scholarship focuses on the 
rivalry between the ḥājib’s and qāḍī’s courts, highlighting the idea that the ḥājib used the Yāsā to 
settle disputes between the Mamluks. Then, between 1352 and 1353, his jurisdiction expanded over 
the public, at times. This expansion transgressed the qāḍī’s courts. On other occasions, it 
complemented.204 While these views are fundamental and will be explored, this chapter will try to 
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examine the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib from a different angle that considers the 
state’s political and economic conditions. This chapter will argue that the expansion of the ḥājib’s 
jurisdiction was one of the moments when maẓālim was politically utilised by the Mamluks to 
achieve broader objectives. Maẓālim was the channel that allowed the Mamluks to expand the 
jurisdiction of the ḥājib and legitimise the emergence of a new form of justice as siyāsah courts; the 
state used maẓālim to legitimise the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib. It could also signify 
competition between different elements of the ruling class, especially as prevailing conditions 
somewhat weakened the sultans of the later fourteenth century. The theory of al-Māwardī offered 
the ruler the right to delegate the supervision of maẓālim to one of his subordinates.205 This 
provided grounds for the Mamluks to expand the jurisdiction of the ḥājib. This chapter will argue 
that two main factors informed the expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction. The first was the will of the 
sultans and amīrs to have a greater say in judicial matters, together with their constant need for 
legitimization. This made them want to interfere in the judicial matters without harming their public 
image, which they strived to build over the years. The second was the state’s economic condition 
that forced it to control its financial resources. These were the main reasons behind the expansion of 
the jurisdiction of the ḥājib and the emergence of the siyāsah courts. In that respect, the objective of 
this chapter is to highlight the struggle between the political and religious establishments. The 
conflict was not because the ḥājib violated some of the provisions of the sharīʿah, as some of the 
contemporary historians and jurists claimed.206 The presence of the ḥājib’s court meant that an 
independent and a parallel form of justice emerged, widening its sphere of influence, and enabling 
the Mamluks to have a greater say in judicial matters. Most importantly, members of the religious 
establishment such as al-Maqrīzī and Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī wanted to remain the sole interpreters of 
the law, so they rejected the emergence of this new form of justice because it challenged their 
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authority. They tried to add a heretical flavor to the siyāsah and the ḥājib’s post.207 Even though the 
ḥājib’s court proved to be very effective in financial cases, which was vitally needed given the 
state’s economic condition during this period, the religious establishment rejected the expansion 
seeing as they did not have authority over this new form of justice. 
 While the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib is considered a turning point in the 
history of maẓālim, it is also vital to underscore how maẓālim functioned between 1341 and 1382. 
This will help in understanding the context out of which this development took place. The shift in 
political power that occurred under the sons of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, which made the Mamluk 
oligarchy stronger and allowed them at times to diminish the authority of the sultan, was projected 
in maẓālim. Until the third reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad (r. 1310-1341), the sultan customarily 
presided over maẓālim, as this marked his sovereignty and consolidated his legitimacy, as explained 
in the previous chapter. However, under the weak rule of the Qalāwūnid s, the power of maẓālim 
was shared between the sultan and the viceroy (nāʾib al-sālṭana).208 While al-Maqrīzī reported that 
the descendants of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad followed the tradition of their father and used to sit in al-
iwān to review maẓālim petitions,209 al-Shujāʻī maintained that nāʾib al-salṭana presided over 
maẓālim; these sessions were usually held at his palace (dār al-niyābah).210 This reflects a more 
general power struggle that was taking place during this period. Some of the sons of al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad remained very keen on presiding over maẓālim such as al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ b. Qalāwūn. 
The expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction occurred during the reign of al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ.211 Although 
under the Qalāwūnids dār al-ʿadl was still present, the magnificent venue lost its glory, as maẓālim 
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was not necessarily held in it, when the authority of the holder of the office of nāʾib al-sālṭana 
increased during this period. According to al-Subkī, nawwāb al-salṭana had the same duties as the 
sultan, and they had the right to revoke the orders of the sultan if he commanded anything that was 
against welfare.212 They also had the authority to interfere in the administration of justice and 
review the verdicts that were delivered by the qāḍīs, if they felt that they exceeded the limits.213 The 
is also confirmed by al-Shujāʿī’s narrative that reportes how nāʾib al-sālṭana addressed the sultan. 
Al-Shujāʿī reported how one of nawwāb al-salṭana addressed sultan al-Ṣaliḥ Ismāʿīl b. Qalāwūn 
when he appointed him to the post in 1342. Nāʾib al-sālṭana said, “I accept, but on one condition. 
The sultan has to consult the Mamluk in what he says, and none objects to what I do.”214 In that 
sense, the interference of nawwāb al-salṭana in the administration of justice in general and maẓālim 
in particular was one of the distinguishing features of the period. Another distinct characteristic of 
maẓālim in the fourteenth century was that its jurisdiction expanded over debt and matrimonial 
cases; this was different from the thirteenth century, as most of the cases that were brought before 
maẓālim focused on abuses of power.215 
 The Expansion of Officials’ Roles in Maẓālim 
a) The Expansion of the Jurisdiction of the Ḥājib 
The question of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction has aroused a number of different views among 
scholars and historians. For example, Jørgen Nielsen, in his exceptional monograph, has refuted the 
idea that the ḥājib had any substantial jurisdiction. He rejects the notion of equating the office of the 
ḥājib with maẓālim. He argues that this argument was promoted by al-Qalqashandī and al-Maqrizī, 
who equated the institution of maẓālim that was described by al-Māwardī with the ḥājib’s 
jurisdiction. For Nielsen, this is a flawed argument as confusion exists between the nominal and 
public role of the ḥājib. More importantly, al-Qalqashandī did not include a text of appointment to 
                                                
212 al- Subkī, Muʻīd al-niʻam wa-mubīd al-niqam, 21. 
213 Ibid., 23. 
214 Al-Shujāʻī, Tārīkh al-Malik al-NāṣirMuhạmmad wa-awlādih, 255. 
215 Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” 75. 
 
  52 
the ḥājib that would state that maẓālim was one of his primary duties.216 Furthermore, the ḥājib was 
not one of the officials responsible for reviewing maẓālim petitions that al-Qalqashandī presented. 
According to Jørgen Nielsen, the ḥājib was one of many officials who were present in maẓālim 
sessions and attended the khidma. It is possible that the nature of his post allowed him to attain 
more authority than any other official; the ḥājib was one of the officials who handled the cases that 
were reviewed by the sultan. Occasionally, he could deal with a case without referring it to the 
sultan, if he felt that there was no need for this, and this was the reason behind assuming that the 
ḥājib had jurisdiction. Jørgen Nielsen argues that the ḥājib was, in essence, a military judge; he 
decided cases that were related to iqṭāʿ and income distribution.217 
 While Nielsen’s argument is valid, there is further evidence that needs to be considered. 
According to al-Qalqashandī, the office of the ḥājib in the Mamluk sultanate was the equivalent to 
the office of the master of the gate (ṣāḥib al-bāb) during the Fāṭimids.218 According to al-Maqrizī, 
one of the duties of the holder of this office was the administration of maẓālim.219 Furthermore, 
according to Robert Irwin, al-Subkī, al-Maqrīzī, and al-Qalqashandī could not promote this 
groundless claim when it did not exist. This is further confirmed by the fact that al- Subkī wrote his 
treatises in the Baḥrī period, while al-Maqrīzī and al-Qalqashandī wrote during the Circassians.220 
Moreover, Ibn al-Furāt and Ibn Taghrībirdī confirm the fact that the ḥājib acquired substantial 
judicial authority.221 While these authors were expressing the opinion of some of the members of 
the religious establishment and society, it is implausible that they all made this unfounded assertion. 
Jørgen Nielsen maintains that he reached this conclusion based on “indirect evidence;” they did not 
know Arabic, which would hinder them from reviewing maẓālim petitions.222 This is a weak 
argument considering that Robert Irwin agrees with Yossef Rapoport that many of the ḥujjāb and 
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amīrs had a very good understanding of the Ḥanafī madhhab.223 This suggests that they probably 
knew Arabic, or they were assisted. Furthermore, there were scribes and translators in the ḥājib 
courts.224 Consequently, the ḥājib could resort to them if he encountered difficulties. 
 How did the jurisdiction of the ḥājib develop? Robert Irwin maintains that one of the main 
characteristics of the Mamluk state was the expansion of the duties of certain personnel. The ḥājib 
did not spend his life opening and closing the door of the sultan, but his duties expanded to include 
the administration of justice between the Mamluks.225According to al-Maqrīzī, since the Ayyubids 
and the early Mamluks the ḥājib was responsible for settling disputes among soldiers and amīrs 
with minimal jurisdiction over government officials.226 He used to judge these cases based on the 
Yāsā, the law of Genghis Khan.227 It is essential to underline that the ḥājib played an active role in 
maẓālim sessions. According to al-Qalqashandī, the ḥājib was the official responsible for collecting 
maẓālim appeals from petitioners. The chief ḥājib presented the petitions to the sultan, recorded his 
orders, and informed kātib al-sirr of the sultan’s decision.228 This indicates that the ḥājib had two 
positions and was involved in the administration of justice prior to the expansion of his jurisdiction 
over the public. Al-Maqrīzī provides some information about the development of this post. 
According to al-Maqrīzī, the first ḥājib to judge between people was amīr Sayf al-Dīn Sunqur al- 
Nāṣrī in 1345. He was an amīr and a chief ḥājib. He was appointed by sultan al-Kāmil Shaʿbān b. 
Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (r. 1345-1346) to the post of nāʾib al-sāltana in 1345. Al-Maqrīzī asserted 
that he judged between people as part of the duties of nāʾib al-sāltana. In the following month, al-
Kāmil decreed that amīr Raslān would be appointed to the post of the ḥājib and would judge 
between people. Al-Maqrīzī maintained that during the reign of al- Muẓaffar Ḥājjī (r.1346-1347) 
the judicial power of the ḥujjāb diminished. However, when al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ attained the throne in 
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1351, he appointed amīr Sayf al-Dīn Jurjī, to the office of the ḥājib and decreed that he would 
review debt cases based on siyāsah authority.229 Between 1352 and 1353 the first case was brought 
before amīr Sayf al-Dīn Jurjī in dār al-ʿadl.230 From al-Maqrīzī’s perspective, the judicial authority 
that the ḥājib enjoyed among the Mamluks was accepted. The problem arose when his jurisdiction 
extended to the public.231 It is evident that the power of the ḥājib gradually increased; he was the 
first delegate of the sultan; then, he judged matters related to the army. After that, he judged 
maẓālim cases that were related to the dīwāns,232 The jurisdiction of the ḥājib eventually expanded, 
and by 1353 they heard merchants and civilians petitions, and by that al-Maqrīzī maintained that the 
ḥājib transgressed the qāḍī’s court.233 Although al-Maqrīzī traced the expansion of the ḥājib’s 
jurisdiction, he did not provide reasons for it. One of the possible readings for this could be that al-
Maqrīzī’s objective was to underscore how the ḥājib violated the sharīʿah and transgressed the 
qāḍī’s authority. Hence, he did not provide reasons for the expansion, which could defend the 
ḥājib’s office.  
 According to al-Maqrīzī, the following case marked the expansion of the jurisdiction of the 
ḥājib. This was during the reign of al-Malik al-Sāliḥ ibn Qalāwūn. Al- Malik al- Sāliḥ ordered amīr 
Sayf al-Dīn Jurjī, the ḥājib, to settle a debt case that was brought before the sultan in dār al-ʿadl, 
between 1352-1353. The background of this incident, according to al- Maqrīzī, was that this debt 
case was reviewed by the Ḥanafī chief qāḍī Jamāl al Dīn ʿAbd Allāh al- Turkmānī; he followed the 
doctrine of his school and declared the bankruptcy of the debtors and imprisoned them. The 
creditors, who were Persian merchants, brought their case before the sultan in dār al-ʿadl, as they 
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believed that the Ḥanafī judge delivered an unfair judgment. The debtors refused to pay the price of 
the merchandise they bought from them, claiming that they did not have money, while they used the 
money for other purposes. When the sultan heard their case, he ordered his ḥājib amīr Sayf al-Dīn 
Jurjī to take over the matter. The ḥājib overruled the judgment of the chief qāḍī Jamāl al Dīn ʿAbd 
Allāh al- Turkmānī and took the debtors out of prison; he punished them until they delivered back 
the money to the Persian merchants.234  
 This case is considered a landmark in the history of maẓālim, as the sultan overruled the 
judgment of the sharīʿah court. According to al-Maqrīzī, this was the first time a ḥājib would judge 
and interfere in sharīʿah matters.235 In theory, the judgments of sharīʿah courts were irrevocable 
and final, as long as they did not involve misconduct or corruption.236 It should be emphasised that 
the judgment that the chief qāḍī delivered was in accordance with his school and that the Ḥanafī 
school is very strict concerning debt cases. According to the Ḥanafī school, a debtor must be 
imprisoned for some time before being declared bankrupt. The rest of the schools do not consider 
imprisonment a condition.237 However, al- Malik al Sāliḥ b. Qalāwūn rebuked the Ḥanafī chief qāḍī 
and prohibited him from reviewing debt cases, as he believed that the judgment that the qāḍī 
rendered prevented the proper administration of justice.238 
 This case is considered a landmark in the history of maẓālim because it led to significant 
changes in the subsequent period. It marked the expansion of the ḥājib jurisdiction and the rise of 
siyāsah courts, an independent form of justice that had a parallel jurisdiction to the sharīʿah courts. 
The decree of al- Malik al-Ṣāliḥ b. Qalāwūn authorised the chief ḥājib to settle a debt dispute, a 
type of legal cases that were always brought before the qāḍī’s court. This case constitutes a change 
in the relationship between the sultan and qāḍī’s office. While al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn declared in his 
                                                
234 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār, 3 : 717-718; Rapoport, “Royal Justice and 
Religious Law,” 82-84. 
235 Al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk, 4 :156-157. 
236 Wael Hallaq, “Islamic Law: History and Transformation,” in The New Cambridge History of Islam, ed. Robert Irwin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 162.  
237 Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” 83. 
238 Al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawāʻiz ̣wa-al-iʻtibār fī dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-al-āthār, 3 : 717-718.  
 
  56 
memorandum that any sharīʿah case should be referred to the qāḍīs,239 al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ ibn 
Qalāwūn challenged this established norm and referred it to the ḥājib. This is one of the crucial 
developments of the period in question.  
b) The Appointment of Muftī dār al-ʿadl 
 The muftī was a jurist whose role was to give legal advice and answers to very specific 
questions.240 Although the post of the muftī appears as an independent profession that aimed at 
serving private individuals, the state often interfered in the designation of muftīs, since the seventh 
century, as it felt that this office correlated to public authority and informed the decisions of private 
individuals. Eventually, the post of the muftī became one of the public offices and religious 
professions.241 The office of the muftī was responsible for rendering legal advice to the rulers, 
qāḍīs, and public.242 One of the innovations that the Mamluks introduced in maẓālim was the post 
of muftī dār al-ʿadl. There is no mention in al-Māwardī’s theory of this particular post. In that 
respect, this had been initiated in relation to the particular needs of this period. While we do not 
know the exact date when this post was introduced, historians tend to agree that this position was 
introduced in the middle of the fourteenth following the expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction around 
1360.243 Some of the prominent jurists who occupied this office were Ibn al-Ṣāʾigh in 1364 and 
Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī.244According to al-Qalqashandī, muftī dār al-ʿadl was one of the religious 
professions.245 In Cairo, there were four muftī dār al-ʿadl, one for each madhhab.246 In Damascus 
and Aleppo, there were only Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī muftīs.247 Al-Qalqashandī maintained that the role 
of the holder of this office was to be present in dār al-ʿadl to give legal advice to any case or matter 
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that was brought before dār al-ʿadl. It was one of the most prestigious religious positions a scholar 
could occupy. In terms of status, muftī dār al-ʿadl was very similar to the military judge and used to 
sit beside the four chief qāḍīs.248 
 The post of muftī dār al-ʿadl is often viewed as one of the innovations that the Mamluks 
introduced in maẓālim; it accompanied the expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of 
siyāsah courts developed along with appointed muftīs, who had jurisdiction over criminal and civil 
cases, and they were independent of the qāḍī’s jurisdiction.249 Part of the duties of muftī dār al-ʿadl 
was to give legal advice to the sultan and ḥājib during maẓālim sessions. Therefore, muftīs were one 
of the officials who were obliged to attend majlis al-maẓālim like the four chief qāḍīs regularly.250 
Although many of the qāḍīs and state officials who regularly attended maẓālim sessions were 
initially muftīs, they were not officially appointed to this position until the second half of the 
fourteenth century when offering legal advice became a state activity.251 In maẓālim sessions, the 
ruler used to seek the advice of some of the legal scholars, and by the second half of the fourteenth 
century, the post of muftī dār al-ʿadl became a permeant position.252  
 Although al-Maqrīzī, Ibn Taghrībirdī, and Ibn Iyās cited the names of the jurists and judges, 
who occupied the office of muftī dār al-adlʿ in Cairo and Damascus, some of whom were also 
military judges, we do not have enough information about the role they played in maẓālim 
sessions.253 According to Eleonora Fernandes, some muftīs insisted on their legal positions and were 
praised by chroniclers such as qāḍī  Tāj al-Dīn al-Ṭarābulusī, who was a muftī dār al- adlʿ, refused 
to change them.254 However, we do not have access to information about their role in these sessions, 
particularly the ones which were led by the ḥājib. One of the possible readings for this as Jørgen 
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Nielsen argues could be that muftī dār al- adlʿ played a nominal role.255 Building on Nielsen’s 
argument, this innovation could be viewed as seeking to maintain a balance between the political 
and religious establishments. Political authorities introduced the office of muftī dār al adlʿ to please 
the jurists and judges while preserving the judicial authority that they gained through the expansion 
of the siyāsah courts. Eleonora Fernandes argues that, the sultans and amīrs resorted to muftīs to 
legitimise their actions that were met by opposition because they had a broader scope of 
interpretation. It is important to note that resorting to a muftī remained a risk, as not all of them 
were corrupt and accepted bribes.256 However, it was risky to issue a fatwā that went against the 
sultan’s interest, according to Eleonora Fernandes. By the end of the fourteenth century, this issue 
intensified.257 Therefore, the office of muftī dār al-ʿadl could be viewed as providing a balance to 
the relationship between these two authorities, who were often in a continuous struggle over 
jurisdiction. While the post was considered very prestigious, and the highest rank a muftī could 
occupy, muftīs did not play a crucial role in maẓālim sessions.258 One of the reasons behind this 
could be that by the time the post of muftī dār al-ʿadl was introduced, the jurisdiction of 
the ḥājib already expanded. The ḥājib could resort to the Yāsā, which muftīs could not comprehend 
and did not have any authority over. In that sense, this post was a title only and did not entail an 
influential role in maẓālim.  
The Will of the Political Establishment to Interfere in Judicial Matters 
While the expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction and the appointment of muftī dār al-ʿ adl 
were two key developments that took place in maẓālim in the second half of the fourteenth century, 
it appears that the impact of the expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction was more profound. This 
development had broader implications for the Mamluk legal system. The expansion of the ḥājib’s 
jurisdiction through maẓālim legitimized the emergence of a new form of justice that was 
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concentrated in the hands of political and not religious authorities. This idea becomes more 
apparent when we consider the theoretical discussions on the role of the ḥājib and siyāsah.   
 The verdict that the chief ḥājib Sayf al-Dīn Jurjī rendered was based on siyāsah authority.259 
In theory, the ruler did not have the right to legislate but to issue administrative regulations that 
were confined by the sharīʿah. The aim behind these administrative regulations was to apply, 
complement, or enforce the sharīʿah. According to Joseph Schacht, it is one of the main reasons 
police, taxation, and criminal justice did not fall under the qāḍī’s jurisdiction.  
 One cannot deal with the expansion of the ḥājib jurisdiction without tackling three main 
forms of justice: siyāsah, Yāsā, and sharīʿah. They intertwine with maẓālim. Al-Maqrīzī asserts that 
the ḥājib delivered his judgments based on the siyāsah, which for him was, in essence, the Yāsā, the 
law of Genghis khan.260 The distinction between these two forms of justice is quite significant, as 
they uncover the resentment among the religious establishment and the reason why the literature on 
maẓālim often focuses on the tension between the qāḍī’s and ḥājib’s courts, ignoring other possible 
readings, which were related to the desire of the sultan and amīrs to have a greater say in judicial 
matters. This was the core of the matter.  
 In essence, the legal sphere was governed by two main powers: juristic doctrine and sultanic 
authority, which set the parameters of the siyāsah. Jonathan Berkey and Kristen Stilt maintain that 
the sultan and religious establishment were aware that they could not govern without the existence 
of both of them. They were in a symbiotic relationship; each of them acknowledged that his 
existence was necessary for the survival of the other.261 As Jonathan Berkey asserts, the Mamluks 
supplied the religious establishment with all their needs, which were either financial or physical, by 
building and sponsoring different madrasas and mosques. On the other hand, by sponsoring various 
endowments, the Mamluks were able to avoid the confiscation of their private wealth and preserve 
some of it for their heirs. At the same time, this allowed the Mamluks to please the ulama, who 
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were a very crucial source of legitimacy. Different sultans understood the importance of their 
relationship with the ulama, who were a momentous source of religious support.262 For instances, 
Baybars did not immeditaly dismiss qāḍī Ibn bint al-Aʿazz from his post but tried to diminish his 
power gradually. Baybars was aware that he needed the support of the religious establishment and 
different Mamluk sultans recognized this. Mamluk sultans did not want to be viewed as violating 
the sharīʿah. However, at times circumstances forced them to act in a different manner. Jonathan 
Berkey and Kristen Stilt argue that they sometimes competed over authority and jurisdiction.263 The 
expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib, and the conflict that aroused due to its emergence, 
underscores this competition. The emergence of this new form of justice that acquired its 
jurisdiction from maẓālim reflected the need for political authorities, the sultan and amīrs, to have a 
greater say in judicial matters, and their constant need for legitimisation. This might have been one 
of the reasons that triggered the expansion of a new form of justice as the siyāsah courts that were 
led by the ḥājib and other military officials. Although maẓālim was considered one of the 
applications of siyāsah,264 which was present and accepted, the jurists did not entirely accept the 
expansion of the siyāsah courts. Some jurists and contemporary historians refused to recognise this 
new form of justice that was led by the ḥājib or military officials starting the second half of the 
fourteenth century. Even though this was another form of maẓālim, and the aim behind it as Yossef 
Rapoport asserts was to avoid the formalism of sharīʿah,265 al-Subkī, al-Maqrīzī and Ibn 
Taghrībirdī believed that this was a deviation.266 In other words, it was always a point of contention 
among scholars.  
 The reason behind the rejection of al- Subkī, al-Maqrīzī, and Ibn Taghrībirdī was the source 
of the law that the ḥājib resorted to; the Yāsā and siyāsah were the core of the rejection. Al-Maqrīzī 
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maintained that there were two types of siyāsah, one that was an integral part of the sharīʿah and 
just, and another one which was not based on the sharīʿah and was forbidden.267 As Guy Buruak 
argues, it is essential to understand the claims that were promoted about the Yāsā, and against 
whom they were raised to understand how the negative perception about the siyāsah developed.268 
This question aroused much controversy both among the scholars of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries and present day historians. The main problem that pertains to al- Maqrīzī’s argument is 
that he equates the Yāsā with the siyāsah, while they are technically two distinct forms of justice. 
Al- Maqrīzī maintained and tried to present semantic grounds that the word siyāsah was derived 
from Yāsā.269 Al-Maqrīzī promoted this claim, and some of the contemporary historians such as Ibn 
Taghrībirdī echoed it.270 Al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Taghrībirdī based their arguments on the negative 
connotation of the Yāsā, and this was one the main reasons behind their rejection of the expansion 
of siyāsah courts and the ḥājib’s court. On the other hand, David Ayalon refutes al-Maqrīzī’s claim 
that siyāsah was derived from the Yāsā.271 In his viewpoint, the Yāsā was never codified, so the 
Mamluk siyāsah could not be derived from it. According to Linda Darling, the Yāsā was the 
customary law of the tribe of Genghis khan, along with some of his orders and advice, which were 
related to governance and military discipline. David Ayalon maintains that the military success of 
Genghis khan gave these decrees a higher value to the extent that his successors considered them 
law.272 Furthermore, as David Ayalon asserts, al-Maqrīzī’s informant, Ibn al-Burhān, did not know 
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other languages except Arabic, and there is no reference that he was interested in Mongol history.273 
David Ayalon argues that al-Maqrīzī focused on the edicts of the Yāsā that showed to what extent it 
contradicted with sharīʿah. Al-Maqrīzī focused on the Mongol traditions that contradicted Islam in 
diet, washing, and social ties; many of these edicts were taboos.274 Even though Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-
ʿUmarī maintained that some of the edicts of the Yāsā conformed to the sharīʿah, and others 
contradicted it,275 al-Maqrīzī omitted all the parts that could bridge the gap between the Yāsā and 
sharīʿah.276 David Ayalon argues that al- Maqrīzī failed to distinguish between laws and customs, 
which created various misconceptions. According to David Ayalon, al-Maqrīzī’s main aim behind 
this was to defend the qāḍī’s office against the ḥājib’s, who had a very high judicial power between 
the Mamluks elites and eventually broaden to the public.277 The ḥājib did not only have a very high 
judicial authority between the Mamluks but also he knew all the details of the Yāsā law. This was 
considered a real threat for the jurists and judges.  
 In spite of the importance of the controversy on legal aspects, there is another dimension 
that should not be overlooked that is related to the power of who should legislate religious 
authorities or political authorities. If we ignored David Ayalon’s refutation and accepted al-
Maqrīzī’s claims, the linguistic link between the siyāsah and Yāsāwould not be the only reason 
behind its rejection and the opposing opinion. The conflict over jurisdiction between the jurists and 
the sultan and the amīrs is a crucial factor that is often ignored. One of the primary reasons behind 
the rejection by the religious establishment of the Yāsā was attributed to the fact that they did not 
fully comprehend it. If they accepted the presence of the Yāsā, this would entail that litigants will 
resort to a new form of justice, that they did not have power over and were not considered the sole 
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interpreters of it. As Kristen Stilt asserts, scholars usually held a prestigious position in society, 
which mainly contributed to their knowledge of Islamic law. Scholars were distinguished by the 
positions that they held, so working as a qāḍī or muḥtasib was something that they strived for.278 In 
that sense, it was very tough for the religious establishment to accept this new form of justice, 
which was concentrated in the hands of the Mamluks, who fully comprehended it and were able to 
settle their internal disputes based on it for long years and wanted to extend it over the public. 
Consequently, the jurists and judges rejected the expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction and tried to 
add a heretical flavor to it by promoting specific arguments about the siyāsah.  
 The competition over jurisdiction between the ruling and religious establishment becomes 
evident by considering al-Subkī’s view about the office of the ḥājib. While al-Maqrīzī justified his 
rejection of the siyāsah by claiming that it was derived from the Yāsā, al-Subkī argued that any 
form of justice that was not based on the sharīʿah was utterly rejected. This idea becomes apparent 
by considering al-Subkī’s view about the post of the ḥājib, where he refers to the expansion of his 
jurisdiction based on the siyāsah. According to al-Subkī, the siyāsah was not useful, and it was one 
of the causes of corruption. The interest of people is in following God’s divine law “al-sharʿ”, as 
He knows what benefits and harms them. For al-Subkī, al-sharʿ was the saviour of the sultans, 
nawwāb al-sulṭan, amīrs, and ḥujjāb. Al-Subkī argued that all the people who followed siyāsah 
suffered.279 Al-Subkī’s concerns about the office of the ḥājib reflect the tension between the 
religious and the political establishments. Some of the jurists had the feeling that the expansion of 
the jurisdiction of the ḥājib would jeopardize their authority. A new form of justice emerged by the 
expansion of the ḥājib jurisdiction, and technically they did not have authority over it whether it 
was the Yāsā or siyāsah. Al- Subkī also underscored the authority that the jurists had over the 
interpretation of the law and that they were the only eligible individuals to deal with it. Francisco 
Apellaniz maintains that the resentment Mamluk historians and scholars showed towards the 
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siyāsah was expected, as they all belonged to the religious establishment. The expansion of siyāsah 
courts challenged this foundational authority.280 
 Among the fourteenth century scholars, we find examples of scholars who were eager 
defendants of siyāsah and saw no contradiction to the sharīʾah. Some jurists tried to bridge the gap 
between the sharīʿah and siyāsah. Whereas al-Subkī was one of the main opponents of the siyāsah, 
Ibn Taymīyah was one of the jurists, who was not against the expansion of the siyāsah authority 
and tried to harmonise the relationship between the sharīʿah  and siyāsah.281 According to Kristen 
Stilt, Ibn Taymīyah was one of the scholars who tried to theorise the relationship between the ruler 
and jurists.282 Ibn Taymīyah and al-Subkī equated siyāsah with personal opinion.283 The significant 
difference between both, as Yossef Rapoport rightly notes, is that al -Subkī refused to acknowledge 
the rigidity of the law, in particular cases, and insisted that the siyāsah should follow the schools of 
law, while Ibn Taymīyah admitted it.284 For Ibn Taymīyah, a strong correlation existed between the 
siyāsah and maẓālim as the institution was founded when the Abbasidscaliphs felt that they did not 
have enough knowledge about al-siyāsah al-ʿādila, so they established maẓālim.285 In that respect, 
siyāsah was the main source of law that was always resorted to in maẓālim. According to Ibn 
Taymīyah, the sharīʿah and siyāsah did not contradict one another. The root of the conflict between 
these two authorities was because those who rejected the siyāsah interpreted the sharīʿah from a 
very rigid perspective and ignored the different sources of the law. On the other hand, those who 
based their judgments upon siyāsah followed their personal opinion and ignored the Qurʾān and 
sunna. This could open the gate to corruption.286 Ibn Taymīyah argued that justice could prevail as 
long as these two bodies cooperated.287 
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 Ibn Taymīyah was one of the jurists who tried to harmonise the relationship between 
siyāsah and sharīʿah. As Yossef Rapoport argues, Ibn Taymīyah was one of the jurists who were 
not against the expansion of the siyāsah courts and tried to resolve the tension between both courts 
by suggesting the reliance on circumstantial evidence in criminal cases.288 However, a different 
interpretation could be drawn from the same evidence. Ibn Taymīyah presented these ideas thirty 
years before the expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction or siyāsah courts, around 1320. Consequently, 
he did not experience the rise of this independent jurisdiction that did not fall under the religious 
establishment’s authority. Even if Ibn Taymīyah was not against the siyāsah authority to the extent 
of al-Subkī and other contemporary historians, we cannot assume that he accepted the emergence of 
this new form of justice that was led by the ḥājib and other military officials. Ibn Taymīyah’s 
acceptance of siyāsah was based on the assumption that sharīʿah set its boundaries, and military 
officials followed the jurists.289 Ibn Taymīyah attempted to elaborate and explain the difference 
between the jurisdiction of the qāḍī and military officials in his book al-Ḥisbah fī al-Islām. In 
essence, for Ibn Taymīyah, a division of labor existed between the judiciary and military officials. 
He argued that the ruler had to surround himself with honest and just individuals.290 Eventually, 
these individuals were appointed to key positions. According to Ibn Taymīyah, based on ʿurf, 
military officials were responsible for applying ḥudūd punishments. This involved amputation of 
the hands of high way robbers and thieves. Moreover, military officials had the right to apply 
flogging instead of amputation. They had jurisdiction over criminal cases and “trial of suspicion,” 
which were initiated by the muḥtasib or governor (wālī).291 Military courts dealt with cases that 
were not accompanied by documentary evidence and witnesses; these were two basic requirements 
in the qāḍī’s court.292 Ibn Taymīyah also identifies the role of the judiciary in this system. The 
judiciary was concerned with cases that had documentary evidence and witnesses. It was also 
                                                
288 Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” 92-93. 
289 Ibn Taymīyah, Majmūʻat fatāwá Ibn Taymīyah, 20: 393.  
290 Ibn Taymīyah, al-Ḥisbah fī al-Islām (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah), 12.  
291 Ibn Taymīyah, al-Ḥisbah fī al-Islām, 15; Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” 80. 
292 Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” 79. 
 
  66 
responsible for protecting rights and reviewing the cases that involved waqf supervisors and 
orphans’ guardians.293 Ibn Taymīyah asserted that both military officials and qāḍīs had jurisdiction, 
but each one of them exercised judicial authority over certain legal cases. According to Ibn 
Taymīyah, whereas in the Mamluk state military officials had jurisdiction over certain legal cases, 
in other places their role was to enforce the law, which was administered by the qāḍīs.294 While Ibn 
Taymīyah distinguished between the jurisdiction of the qāḍī and military officials, he also argued 
that this distinction was inaccurate as God’s commands were accessible to anyone who judged 
between people whether he was a qāḍī or wālī.295 
 The aim of these military courts, as Yossef Rapoport asserts, was to avoid the formalistic 
procedure of sharīʿah courts, which at times hindered the proper administration of justice. In that 
respect, the objective behind the jurisdiction of these military officials was to secure public order.296 
Consequently, these military courts had lenient laws of procedure, and torture was accepted to 
extract confessions. These courts helped in the administration of justice, especially in cases that did 
not have witnesses or documentary evidence.297 It is implied that the role of military courts was 
limited to particular legal cases. While the arguments of Yossef Rapoport are valid, we should not 
ignore that Ibn Taymīyah was writing his treaties before the expansion of siyāsah courts. Until his 
time, the ḥājib did not develop into an independent jurisdiction. The sharīʿah set the boundaries of 
the system that Ibn Taymīyah described, and the jurists and judges played a very active role in it; 
the central role of military officials was to apply the law that the jurists interpreted. According to 
Kristen Stilt, Ibn Taymīyah tried to theorise the relationship between the ruler and the jurists. For 
Ibn Taymīyah, fiqh by default governed siyāsah and shaped its rules and parameters. Thus, he 
called for al- siyāsah al- sharʿiyya, which implied that the siyāsah was limited and governed by the 
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sharīʿah and any siyāsah policy was accepted given that it did not come into conflict with the 
sharīʿah.298 This does not imply that the siyāsah violated the sharīʿah, but it was an independent 
form of justice that emerged in the middle of the fourteenth century that was concentrated in the 
hands of the Mamluks and not the jurists. In that respect, the competition over jurisdiction was the 
main reason behind the rejection.  
 Why were great jurists concerned with the siyāsah authority to that extent in the middle of 
the fourteenth century? There are multiple readings for this phenomenon; a possible interpretation 
for this could be that the members of the religious establishment felt that the expansion of siyāsah 
authority would jeopardize their jurisdiction. Consequently, they had to defend their authority and 
position. Some of them tried to set the boundaries of the siyāsah and to integrate the fiqḥ and 
siyāsah in one framework as Ibn Taymīyah while guarding the status of the jurists and judges in this 
system. On the other hand, there were others who rejected the expansion of the siyāsah entirely and 
tried to add to it a heretical flavour and provide rational and irrational grounds for their refusal. Al-
Subkī, al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Taghrībirdī were advocates of this approach. The core of their rejection 
was that an independent and parallel form of justice emerged, which challenged the religious 
establishment’s authority.  
The Economic Crisis and the Need to Control Financial Resources  
 Regrading the case mentioned before, which triggered the expansion of the ḥājib’s 
jurisdiction in 1353, Yossef Rapoport asserts that, apparently, the debtors knew that based on the 
Ḥanafī madhhab they should spend some time in the qāḍī’s jail. During this time, either the Persian 
merchants would have fled, or the debtors would have declared bankruptcy; in both cases, they 
would escape payment. According to Yossef Rapoport, this case is very significant for several 
reasons. Firstly, it highlighted one of the sharīʿah loopholes, which made the sultan rebuke the 
Ḥanafī chief qāḍī, as he felt that the debtors used one of the legal loopholes to avoid paying the 
money. Secondly, it shows how the formalism of the qāḍī’s court could have enabled the debtors to 
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get out of debt. Francisco Apellaniz agrees with Yossef Rapoport that the jurisdiction of the siyāsah 
expanded over the cases that the sharīʿah’s formalistic attitude prevented the proper application of 
justice.299 Thirdly, it projected the limitations of the quadruple legal system. Even though the 
Ḥanafī madhhab is the most critical regarding debt cases, the sultan felt that the qāḍī’s jurisdiction 
would prevent justice, owing to the fact that they were foreign merchants; they needed more 
protection. On these grounds, the sultan decided to transfer the case to the chief ḥājib.300   
 While the arguments of Yossef Rapoport are valid and provide substantial grounds for the 
expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction, another dimension that should not be ignored is the economic 
condition of the state during this time. By 1347, the Mamluk state encountered multiple economic 
challenges with the plague’s recurrent waves, which forced it to control its financial resources.  
Furthermore, the litigants were foreign merchants; and the state tried to enhance its weak position in 
international trade by creating strong partnerships. It is essential to highlight that, according to al-
Maqrīzī, in the same year and the year before the expansion of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction, many 
Persian merchants left their countries and decided to move to Egypt and Syria because of the 
injustice of their rulers. Al- Maqrīzī reported that between 1351 and 1353, various Persian 
merchants came to Egypt and Syria because of the injustice committed by their wālī al-Ashraf 
Damerdāsh. In 1353, al-Ashraf Damrdāsh wrote to al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ b. Qalāwūn and requested the 
return of his Persian subjects and mainly merchants.301 They refused to go back. This may explain 
why al-Malik al-Ṣaliḥ ibn Qalāwūn took this radical decision and transferred the case of the Persian 
merchants to the ḥājib. The presence of these foreign merchants directly contributed to the 
economy. Hence, the sultan’s interference, in this case, was not only to plug in one of the sharīʿah 
loopholes, as Yossef Rapoport argues,302 but it could also be viewed as one of the means to control 
financial resources during the economic crisis. It was one of the sultan’s primary duties to ensure 
the proper administration of justice, and the state’s economic condition created a pressing need. 
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Through the “superior justice” of maẓālim, the sultan was able to interfere in the administration of 
justice directly and delegate his judicial authority to one of his subordinates, who in this case was 
the ḥājib. 
 According to Yossef Rapoport, the ḥājib had a very effective jurisdiction over commercial 
cases, even though works of jurisprudence cover this matter extensively. This effective jurisdiction 
developed in the second half of the fourteenth century through maẓālim, and its impact manifested 
in the fifteenth century.303 Robert Irwin maintains in the fifteenth century, the ḥājib had a very 
effective jurisdiction over commercial cases, despite the multiple attempts to limit his authority.304 
While Francisco Apellaniz was trying to refute the argument that the ḥājib delivered arbitrary 
judgments and usurped the qāḍī’s judicial authority based on Venetian descriptions, his data reveals 
another angle of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction. The ḥājib tried to follow a procedural tradition that was 
very similar to the qāḍī’s court. He held trials for merchants that could not be viewed as arbitrary. 
In his trials, he used coercion which, as Ibn Taymīyah argued, was accepted in military courts and 
sent all parties to jail until he extracted the confession.305 In that respect, he was able he was able to 
administer justice properly but following a different approach, especially in commercial cases. He 
accepted the oath by swearing on other scriptural texts as the Gosples.306 His court proved to be 
very efficient in the cases involving Venetian and Genoese traders, who were, as noted before, vital 
trading partners for the Mamluks.307 As Francisco Apellaniz asserts, the siyāsah justice proved to be 
very useful in cases that involved financial disputes. The ḥājib relied on various evidence; he 
reviewed account books and considered written evidence that was presented by unrighteous 
witnesses from the perspective of the sharīʿah courts.308 
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  The idea that the state was trying to control its financial resources and improve its 
economic condition through the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib becomes more clear by 
considering the fact that starting in the second half of the fourteenth century, the ḥājib settled 
disputes that involved non-Muslims and Frankish traders who used to resort to sharīʿah courts or 
appealed to the sultan in his maẓālim sessions.309 Francisco Apellaniz asserts that, at times, Muslim 
merchants abused maẓālim and filed cases against foreign merchants and did not show up. In this 
case, maẓālim inflicted damage, which made Frankish traders prefer the ḥājib’s courts. In siyāsah 
courts, the Frankish traders had the opportunity to be heard by an official instantly with a more 
flexible procedure. Foreign merchants brought their cases before siyāsah courts, as they felt that it 
protected their rights; they were judged on equal grounds. However, in the qāḍī’s court, at times, 
the formalistic procedure of sharīʿah prevented the administration of justice; some litigants were 
able to use some of the sharīʿah loopholes as in the case of the Persian merchants. This implies that 
as Francisco Apellaniz argues, siyāsah courts did not replace sharīʿah, and it was not a sort of 
secular justice. However, the jurists and state were adapting to changing circumstances and the 
presence of foreigners and non-Muslims.310 The involvement of the state in trade was critical during 
this period, in view of the fact that it was trying to improve its economic condition. The expansion 
of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib ensured the proper administration of justice; the presence of this 
particular jurisdiction regulated the economic life in a way that was needed during this critical 
period.  
 Although the ḥājib represented another form of legal pluralism, which was in line with the 
Mamluks legal strategy, his court was a matter of debate and competition for the jurist and judges, 
with the expansion of his jurisdiction over debt and matrimonial cases.311 In theory, debt and 
matrimonial cases, which presumably touched a large portion of cases, fell under the qāḍī’s 
jurisdiction. This was one of the main reasons why the siyāsah courts were perceived as a rival for 
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the sharīʿah.312 The siyāsah courts, which were led by the ḥājib, were one of the attempts of the 
Mamluk state to deal with diversity. Therefore, there were Venetian scribes, translators, and the 
ḥājib borrowed different legal procedures. In the viewpoint of Francisco Apellaniz, this was a kind 
of adjustment and coexistence that aimed at facilitating transactions.313 The Mamluks did not want 
to override the sharīʿah, but they only tried to accommodate diversity during economic crises.314 
Thus, one of the possible readings for the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib is that the state 
wanted to concentrate judicial authority in the hands of competent individuals, who were able to 
judge and enforce the law, but the expansion was rejected by some of the jurists and contemporary 
historians. 
 The expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib was one of the key moments in the history of 
maẓālim. It set the stage for the expansion of a new form of justice known by the siyāsah courts 
derived from maẓālim. The ḥājib led it in the middle of the fourteenth century, and in the fifteenth 
century, other military officials presided over it. This was one of the moments when the institution 
was politically utilised to legitimise the emergence of a new form of justice. This chapter tried to 
look at the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ḥājib from a different angle and argue that two main 
factors informed this innovation. These were the will of the sultans and amīrs to have a greater say 
in judicial matters and the state’s economic condition. This urged the state to control its financial 
resources and concentrate judicial authority in the hands of military officials as the ḥujjāb who were 
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4 






 While the Mamluk sultanate entered a phase of political and economic instability since the 
middle of the fourteenth century, the role played by Circassian sultans (1382-1517) was quite 
significant, particularly when compared with the Qalāwūnid  house; nine Circassian sultans attained 
the throne over one hundred and thirty-six years.315 According to John Meloy, one of the distinct 
traits of the Circassian sultans was that they enjoyed a good deed of political authority due to their 
close relationships with the caliphate and the religious establishment.316 These were often two 
indispensable sources of legitimacy. In that respect, the sultan was no longer a nominal figure, as 
noted under the Qalāwūnid s.317 In 1382, Sultan Barqūq (r. 1382-1389/ 1390-1399), the founder of 
the Circassian regime, attained the throne and tried to restore the power of the sultanate, but he 
encountered various problems.318 The financial status of the sultanate was one of the most 
complicated situations that he had to deal with. Historians have tried to provide various 
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interpretations for the economic stagnation that the state entered. One of the primary reasons for 
this critical economic situation was the state’s failure to cover its expenses. In the viewpoint of 
Igarashi Daisuke, the state failed to cover its enormous expenses because of the very high revenue 
that the military, women quarters (harīm), and eunuchs received, along with the large sums that 
were paid to the Royal Mamluks to guarantee their loyalty.319 It is also important to note that the 
sultanate continued to suffer from the devastating impact of the plague that occurred between 1348 
and 1349, which had a demolishing effect on agriculture. In rural areas, peasants suffered, as the 
government neglected land management, and iqṭāʿ holders extracted very high taxes.320  Land 
management was one of the dilemmas that the state had to deal with during this period. This issue 
intensified with the privatisation and waqfization of land, which was the primary source of tax 
revenue, and the treasury highly depended on it. While the threat of external powers relatively 
diminished during the middle of the fourteenth century, this threat was regenerated towards the end 
of the century with the rise of the Ottoman empire.321  
 This chapter will focus on two key developments, emerging as a result of these conditions,  
that took place in maẓālim under the Circassian regime. The first is the movement of maẓālim to the 
Royal Stables by Barqūq in 1387, and the second is the justice offered by the purchased Mamluks 
(julbān) between 1456 and 1457. The aim of this chapter is to understand to what extent these key 
developments were informed by the economic and political conditions of the state. This chapter will 
be divided into two main sections. Section one will focus on the rise of the Circassian Mamluks 
under Barqūq, and the very centralised policy he adopted during this period. The objective is to 
understand the role played by the institution of maẓālim during this period and to show that 
Barqūq’s policies towards centralisation and maẓālim were interrelated. This chapter will argue that 
the movement of maẓālim to Royal Stables by Barqūq in 1387 was a symbolic act, which reflected 
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policy of centralisation. In other words, it was part of some administrative reforms that he 
introduced to encounter the financial crisis and gain better control over his entourage. In the 
fifteenth century, the economic recession continued, and the state entered a phase of deterioration. It 
seems that a gradual decentralisation process took place, and it was one of the solutions that the 
state had to accept to survive. Therefore, the second section will focus on the decentralisation 
process that took place on multiple levels, arguing that what was happening in maẓālim was part of 
a wider trend that was taking place in the fifteenth century. One of the key trends was the 
privatisation of different state activities such as justice, ḥisba, and protection. In the fifteenth 
century, the selling of public offices and accepting bribery were also very common practices. Carl 
Petry agrees with John Meloy that the state accepted the institutionalisation of these unlawful 
practices to increase its revenue.322 In the fifteenth century, bribery and the purchase of public 
offices were among the key features of the administration. Eventually, it became embedded in the 
system and institutionalised.323 Maẓālim was one of the institution that were impacted by these 
transformations. This chapter will argue that what happened in maẓālim was part of a broader trend 
of decentralisation and privatisation of different state activities. The aim behind it was to find other 
sources of revenue and to please the Mamluk class. In light of the above, this chapter will explore 
two main phases that maẓālim passed through under the Circassian Mamluks. The first was the 
movement of maẓālim to the Royal Stables. The second was the gradual decentralisation of the 
institution and the justice offered by the julbān.  
The Movement of Maẓālim to Royal Stables 
 The movement of maẓālim from al- īwān al-kabīr (dār al-ʿadl) to the Royal Stables (al-
iṣṭabl al-sulṭānī) was an indication of his political intentions. Barqūq tried to bring the institution 
closer to sultanic overview and made it more accessible to the public, which this section will 
discuss. Historians have agreed that maẓālim reappears as a powerful institution during the reign of 
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sultan Barqūq. The sultan encouraged the public to carry their petitions to maẓālim.324 When sultan 
Barqūq restored the power of the sultanate, he held maẓālim in dār al-ʿadl for some time. Then, in 
1387, according to al-Maqrīzī, Barqūq decided to move maẓālim sessions from al-īwān al-kābīr, 
which was built by al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, to the Royal Stables.325 This place was located at the 
lower part of the citadel and more accessible to the public than al-īwān al-kabīr.326 He changed the 
days of the biweekly sessions, so the khidma became on Sundays and Wednesdays instead of 
Mondays and Thursdays. Then, he changed it again to become on Tuesdays, Saturdays, and Fridays 
afternoons.327 
 The movement of maẓālim to the Royal Stables is often viewed as one of the key 
developments in the institution. Historians have tried to provide various interpretations for the 
choice of Barqūq to this unprecedented location, and a number of explanations have been 
forwarded. It is essential to highlight that the movement of maẓālim to Royal Stables did not imply 
that the institution became insignificant. Barqūq lived in al-iṣṭabl al- sulṭānī when he was atābak 
al-ʿasākir. This was the custom, at a time, that al-amīr al-kabīr or atābak al-ʿasākir to live in al-
iṣṭabl al- sulṭānī and consider it the ruling complex. Then, he moved to the royal palace when he 
attained the throne.328 For this reason, Linda Darling argues that the Royal Stables often symbolised 
political sovereignty.329 On the other hand, Fumihiko Hasebe argues that the movement of maẓālim 
to the Royal stables had political and social implications that cannot be ignored. In his study of the 
cases brought before Barqūq, he has tried to find a connection between popular movements and 
maẓālim.330 In his viewpoint, one of the reasons that triggered the movement of maẓālim was that 
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Barqūq was aware of the threat of having the state functions and maẓālim in the same building (dār 
al-ʿadl). This unity diminished the role of maẓālim and made the place represent ceremonies, so he 
decided to dissect them.331 Fumihiko Hasebe provides another interpretation that Barqūq wanted to 
break from the Qalāwūnid s’ practice and to establish his distinct ruling ideology and tradition. In 
his viewpoint, Barqūq came with a new ruling ideology that capitalised on the acceptance of the 
ruled, and he focused on the “cultural politics.” This location enhanced this ruling ideology and 
reflected that the sultan went down from his place of power to the lower part of the citadel closer to 
the public to hear their complaints and to try to solve them.332 In that respect, Fumihiko Hasebe 
agrees with Linda Darling that Royal Stables was a significant location that represented political 
sovereignty.333 Another crucial factor that Fumihiko Hasebe highlights in the movement of  
maẓālim to the Royal Stables was that Barqūq eliminated the feeling of intimidation that litigants 
had to experience when they walked through the citadel.334 This is further supported by the fact that 
this location was very close to Cairo’s residential quarters.335 Hence, this location highlighted the 
accessibility of the sultan, which was often one of the main objectives of the institution of maẓālim. 
Nasser Rabbat argues that different sultans tried to choose the most publicly accessible location, 
which explains the frequent change of the maẓālim location.336 In the viewpoint of Fumihiko 
Hasebe, Barqūq moved maẓālim sessions closer to the Rumayla square and residential quarters, the 
place where popular movements took place.337 By that, the movement of maẓālim to this new 
location allowed the sultan to have better control over his entourage and become closer to his 
subjects. This complemented his centralization policy.  
 The movement of maẓālim to the Royal Stables was one of the key developments that took 
place in the institution not only because of the significance of location but also because of other 
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factors. This movement was accompanied by significant transformations in the institution, in terms 
of the protocol, litigants, and types of cases brought before maẓālim. When Barqūq moved maẓālim 
to the Royal Stables, he encouraged his subjects to complain about any unjust act. His motive may 
have been to control state officials. Ibn al-Furāt asserted that Barqūq altered maẓālim protocol and 
introduced a new system that obliged litigants to pass first by the ḥājib or qāḍī. In that respect, 
litigants were allowed to submit their petitions directly to the sultan on one condition, that they had 
either passed first by the ḥājib or qāḍī. If the ḥājib or qāḍī passed a judgment that did not satisfy 
one of the parties, they could bring their case before the sultan, who would personally review it. 
Litigants who did not follow this procedure and directly submitted their petition to the sultan were 
beaten and forced to leave the session.338 Ibn al-Furāt considered this procedure revolutionary in the 
history of maẓālim, mostly because Barqūq personally reviewed the cases and did not delegate this 
duty to one of his subordinates or informed the ḥājib his decision.339 It is worthy of note that 
Barqūq was only accompanied by kātib al-sirr, dawādārs, and head of the police (nāqib al-juyūsh) 
in these maẓālim sessions.340 There is no reference of the four chief qāḍīs, mufti dār al-ʿadl, amīrs, 
wakīl bayt al-māl, and kātib al-dast. These officials customarily attended maẓālim sessions, but Ibn 
al-Furāt did not mention their presence. This was another significant change in the protocol of 
maẓālim.   
 The new system that Barqūq introduced was considered one of the crucial developments in 
the institution at the end of the fourteenth century. Modern historians have tried to underscore its 
implications. Yossef Rapoport argues that Barqūq distinguished himself from the sharīʿah and 
siyāsah courts and directly intervened in the administration of justice.341 In his viewpoint, Barqūq 
directly intervened in the legal system when he forced litigants to pass first by the ḥājib or qāḍī. 
Yossef Rapoport argues that the intervention of Barqūq in the legal system was more radical than 
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Baybars’s.342 On the other hand, Fumihiko Hasebe argues that Barqūq’s maẓālim served as a court 
of appeal against the decisions of the sharīʿah and siyāsah courts, which were led by the qāḍī and 
ḥājib. It is essential to highlight that Fumihiko Hasebe argues that Ibn al-Furāt did not regard 
Barqūq’s maẓālim sessions as a superior court over the sharīʿah and siyāsah courts.343 The 
insistence of Barqūq that litigants should pass first by the ḥājib or qāḍī could also be viewed that it 
marked the consolidation of the ḥājib’s jurisdiction. The justice that the ḥājib offered became an 
integral part of the Mamluk legal system or one of the forms of justice that the state offered. This 
idea becomes more apparent by considering the fact that when Barqūq moved maẓālim to Royal 
Stables, he forced litigants to either pass first by the ḥājib or qāḍī.344 This is further supported by 
the fact that Mathieu Tillier maintains that under Barqūq maẓālim and sharīʿah courts 
complimented one another. While Yossef Rapoport argues that Barqūq used maẓālim to intervene 
in the legal system, Mathieu Tillier asserts that these two forms of justice complimented one 
another under his rule; some of the cases that were brought before maẓālim were referred to 
qāḍīs.345 It is important to note that Jørgen Nielsen argues that, in general, these two forms of 
justice never competed over jurisdiction and complimented each other. 346 
 Barqūq did not only alter the maẓālim protocol, but he also encouraged a new audience to 
come and submit their petitions; these were the residents of rural areas. Ibn al-Furāt cited more than 
one case that was submitted by peasants to the sultan against governors. Interestingly enough, these 
cases were submitted against governors and amīrs who oppressed and unlawfully obtained money 
from the peasants. Clearly, the system offered the sultan a way to control these officials. The sultan 
took the side of the peasants and ruled with very harsh judgment. In one of the incidents, the sultan 
decreed that amīr Naṣr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shāh, the governor, would be whipped and dismissed 
                                                
342 Yossef Rapoport argues that Baybars’s indirectly intervened in the administration of justice when he introduced the 
quadruple legal system. Rapoport “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” 85. 
343 Hasebe, “Sultan Barquq and his Complaining in the Royal Stables,” 318. 
344 Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh Ibn al-Furāt, 9: 17.  
345 Tillier, “The Maẓālim in Historiography,” 9. 
346 Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State, 114.  
 
  79 
from his position. 347 Fumihiko Hasebe argues that economic benefits often triggered Barqūq’s 
judgments.348 However, these incidents could be viewed as one of the moments when maẓālim was 
politically utilised to achieve broader objectives. This was part of Barqūq’s reform plan to 
encounter the economic crisis, a symbolic act that reflected his centralisation policy. This idea is 
better understood when we consider the background of this incident and how Barqūq was trying to 
diminish the power of the amīrs over agricultural lands.  
 Barqūq was very focused on administrating justice in ruler areas. In his first maẓālim 
sessions, he gathered all the land administrators (mubāshirūn) who worked for the amīrs and 
warned them from imposing illegal taxes on peasants.349 Barqūq wanted to limit the authority of the 
amīrs over land because the decrease in taxable lands was one of the main factors that contributed 
to the financial crisis. The lands that produced large sums were rented either by senior amīrs or 
were converted into waqf.350 Barqūq tried by every possible means to limit this practice and 
believed that the transformation of many of the state’s lands into waqf was one of the primary 
reasons behind the state’s declining economic condition. This was because the increase in waqf 
meant less revenue for the treasury as these lands were tax- free.351 These were all forces that 
alienated the lands that the state had control over and damaged many of the rural districts, which 
impacted the state’s financial situation. This problem arose because some amīrs illegally obtained 
these lands when they found that their income dramatically decreased after the plague. They tried to 
increase their land share by gaining power over different areas. Most of these violations happened 
under the later Qalāwūnid s when the sultan had a very weak character, and his authority over 
governmental matters decreased.352 In other words, the sultan tried to use the maẓālim to solve the 
land issues that restricted state revenue. 
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 Barqūq tried to restructure the sultanate and to confront the financial crisis that the state had 
drawn in. As Fumihiko Hasebe argues, although it was a period of economic crisis at the micro 
level, Barquq was very keen on reform.353Maẓālim could be viewed as one of the institutions that 
played a crucial role in this reform project and was part of Barqūq’s plan to encounter the financial 
crisis. To understand this idea, one must look at one of the major developments that took place at 
the beginning of Barqūq’s reign.354 One of these early attempts was the introduction of a particular 
office known by al-dīwān al-mufrad. This financial office was established to provide monthly 
salaries and closing allowances for the Royal Mamluks, one of the most important factions in the 
army. This office obtained its revenue from particular lands that did not fall under the treasury.355 
Barqūq established this system to guarantee a constant revenue source for the Royal Mamluks, 
whose income decreased because of reduced state lands. Igarashi Daisuke argues that dīwān al-
mufrad allowed Barqūq to gain better control over the military and the most powerful faction. This 
dīwān was independent of the state’s financial system, as iqṭāʿ lands primarily funded it. 
Consequently, this dīwān avoided the financial difficulties that the state encountered and allowed 
the sultan to restore his authority over the Mamluks.356 
 It is important to note that dīwān al-mufrad was established to encounter the alienation of 
government lands from the treasury.357 This was a solution that the Circassian sultan Barqūq came 
up with. In that respect, we can argue that maẓālim sessions that were held by Barqūq 
complemented the role played by this office. In other words, sultan Barqūq gave maẓālim a function 
that far exceeded that of the judiciary body. One of the main drawbacks of the iqṭāʿ system was that 
most of the lands were either inherited or privatized, which led to the collapse of this system. The 
Mamluk elites controlled most of the lands, and the state’s lands were sold to them. Barqūq tried to 
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solve the problem of land management earlier. Barqūq believed that the transformation of many of 
the state’s lands into waqf was one of the primary reasons behind its declining economic condition. 
This put him in direct conflict with the religious establishment. According to al-Maqrīzī, in 1379, 
Barqūq was ruling in his capacity as atābak al-ʿasākir.358 He gathered the ulama and called for the 
cancellation of the lands that were transferred into waqf and its return under the treasury’s 
control.359 Igarashi Daisuke argues that Barqūq tried to diminish the power that the amīrs had over 
land because the increase in waqf meant less revenue for the treasury, as these lands were tax-
free.360 These were all forces that alienated the state’s lands had control over, which negatively 
impacted its financial situation and damaged some rural districts. The amirs obtained these lands 
when their income dramatically decreased after the plague; they tried to increase their land share by 
gaining power over different agricultural areas to compensate for their lost revenue. This eventually 
became a common practice under the later Qalāwūnid s, especially during the reigns of the sultans, 
who had very weak characters and limited authority over governmental matters. The legality of the 
amīrs’ violations remained unquestioned, as Igarashi Daisuke asserts until Barqūq tried to demolish 
this established norm. Al-Maqrīzī maintained that the ulama rejected the abrogation of waqf lands. 
It is important to note that the ulama depended on the awqāf and tried to protect this system as 
much as they could.361 This incident reflected the power that the amīrs developed at the end of the 
fourteenth century that even the religious establishment could not challenge. Al- Bulqīnī, who was a 
military judge, explicitly mentioned that the amīrs were the ones who ordered the judges. If the 
judges did not obey their orders, they would be dismissed.362 In that respect, judges were left with 
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very few options and had to accept. Igarashi Daisuke asserts that some of the attempts of Barqūq to 
limit the power that the amīrs had over land eventually failed, and the state was only able to impose 
levies on some of these lands.363 This incident is very indicative, as it shows the amount of power 
that Mamluk amīrs enjoyed to the extent that they could challenge the ruler’s decision and the 
religious establishment, who ruled with the fear of dismissal.  
 Under these critical economic conditions, Barqūq tried to find other means to limit the 
authority and control the state’s financial resources. The maẓālim was one of the institutions that he 
relied on to achieve this objective. As Igarashi Daisuke rightly notes, the selling of the state’s land 
was a common practice in the Mamluk sultanate, and the confiscation of the lands that were 
transformed into waqf was never considered a legal practice.364 This may explain why waqf disputes 
remained the most controversial type of cases that were brought before maẓālim. In the viewpoint 
of Jørgen Nielsen, these cases reflected the struggle between the religious and the military 
establishments.365 It could also be viewed that it reflected the struggle between the ruler and  
Mamluk elites.  A large number of waqfs were confiscated mainly during the reign of Barqūq. 
According to Jørgen Nielsen, there is no evidence that disputes arose because of these 
confiscations.366 
 As Barqūq established dīwān al-mufrad to encounter the isolation of government lands from 
the treasury, he also tried to utilise maẓālim in a way that allowed him to monitor and limit the acts 
of the amīrs and administrators. This enabled him to protect land management and control his 
entourage. Mamluk amīrs and administrators were aware that the sultan was monitoring their 
actions through maẓālim. Barqūq encouraged peasants to complain about any act of oppression that 
was committed against them. As Fumihiko Hasebe rightly notes, Barqūq politically utilised the 
institution and was able to appear as a just ruler in the eyes of his subjects, though the religious 
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establishment was not very content with what he was doing.367 Carl Petry argues that Barqūq 
projected himself as the public’s guardian whose rights were abrogated either by the jurists or state 
officials.368 Barqūq achieved this objective by choosing this unprecedented location and introducing 
a new maẓālim protocol, which attracted a new audience to his sessions. Although Baybars and 
Barqūq had different ruling ideologies due to various circumstances, they were both able to project 
the image of the just ruler and politically utilise the institution. 
Maẓālim in the Fifteenth Century 
 Towards the end of the fourteenth century, maẓālim had undergone significant 
transformations by its movement to the Royal Stables in 1387. The magnificent building of dār al-
ʿadl was no longer considered the primary site of maẓālim, but some sultans, occasionally, held 
maẓālim in it. 369 Nasser Rabbat argues that dār al-ʿadl lost part of its glory in the fifteenth century 
because the idea of praising  jihad and relying on it as one of the main pillars of legitimacy became 
less remarkable. More precisely, the Mamluks no longer depended on it to support their political 
agenda and consolidate their legitimacy. Furthermore, the Mamluk sultanate did not project itself as 
the Islamic empire’s defender, as before.370 This may explain why dār al-ʿadl was used for 
ceremonial events and not maẓālim. In the fifteenth century, the jurisdiction of maẓālim focused 
mainly on two types of petitions; these were regular maẓālim petitions, which complained about 
acts of injustice and oppression, and the second type were petitions that requested iqṭāʿ and official 
posts. 371 The second type of cases were triggered by the state’s financial situation and the 
institutionalisation of some illegal practices.  
 According to al-Maqrīzī, although the successors of Barqūq, including his son al-Nāṣir Farg  
(r.1399-1405/ 1405- 1412), continued the long standing tradition of reviewing petitions in the same 
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location, maẓālim was no longer considered an effective channel of justice. In the words of al-
Maqrīzī, “It was useful for others and unuseful for others, and its harm was more than its 
benefit.”372  The successors of Barqūq continued his policy and presided over maẓālim, in the 
fifteenth century. For instance, al- Muʾayyad Shaykh (r.1412-1421) also reviewed maẓālim 
petitions.373 The grand amīr Ṭaṭar in 1421 held maẓālim sessions after ten days from the death of al- 
Muʾayyad Shaykh. He gathered the judges and amīrs, though he was still in a temporary position. 
This shows to what extent maẓālim remained a crucial source of legitimacy after Barqūq’s death. 
This could be considered one of his attempts to consolidate his legitimacy. Although al-Maqrīzī was 
not very content with the functioning of maẓālim under al-Nāṣir Farg and his successors, Ibn 
Taghrībirdī praised Ṭaṭar (r. 1421) for his just siyāsah. One of the reasons Ibn Taghrībirdī praised 
Ṭaṭar was because he studied Islamic jurisprudence and was trained in the Ḥanafī madhhab. In the 
viewpoint of Ibn Taghrībirdī, Ṭaṭar was considered a just ruler.374 
The case of sultan Ṭaṭar sheds light on multiple developments that took place in the 
institution during the fifteenth century. One of the critical variations under the Circassian Mamluks 
was that maẓālim and siyāsah were used interchangeably. According to al-Maqrīzī, since the rise of 
the Circassian Mamluks al-naẓir fī al-maẓālim became known by ḥukm al-siyāsah that was 
administered by nawwāb al-salṭana, ḥājib al-ḥujjāb, and the sultan.375 Before the rise of the 
Circassian Mamluks, it was not explicitly mentioned that maẓālim functioned based on siyāsah 
authority. When Ṭaṭar held maẓālim in 1421 in the Royal Stables, the senior amīrs, Kātib al-sirr, 
nāqib al-juyūsh, walī, and ḥujjāb attended his maẓālim sessions.376  It is important to note that 
although Ibn Taghrībirdī praised Ṭaṭar for his justice, there is no reference for the four chief qāḍīs 
nor muftī dār al-ʿadl. This reflects that the institution functioned under the umbrella of the siyāsah 
and not sharīʿah. Interestingly enough, Ibn Taghrībirdī did not mention any comment that would 
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reflect his discontent with this idea. On the other hand, Ibn al-Furāt’s discontent about the exclusion 
of the qāḍīs and scholars from Barqūq’s maẓālim was evident when he mentioned that “we did not 
hear about this before from our scholars.”377 This could indicate that the tension that historians and 
jurists expressed in the middle of the fourteenth century about the siyāsah authority and its courts 
started to dissolve by the first half of the fifteenth century. It seems that the religious establishment 
accepted the fact that the siyāsah authority was concentrated in the hands of the political authority 
and allowed them to have a greater say in judicial matters without the need of the qāḍīs to 
legitimise this process. Furthermore, it seems that during these years, the grand amīr presided over 
maẓālim before attaining the throne. Barsbāy (r. 1422- 1438) also held maẓālim after the death of 
Ṭaṭar; then, he became the sultan.378 This reflects the extent to which the institution remained an 
integral part of the Mamluks ruling ideology and an indispensable source of legitimacy.  
It is important to note that in the fifteenth century, the siyāsah courts, which were derived 
from maẓālim, were not only led by the ḥājib, but there is evidence that other military officials held 
sessions.379 While in the fourteenth century, the siyāsah courts were primarily concerned with debt 
issues, in the fifteenth century, their jurisdiction expanded to settle matrimonial cases.380 Yossef 
Rapoport argues that during this period, the siyāsah jurisdiction became parallel to the qāḍī’s court; 
it was considered legitimate and supported by sultanic authority.381 Ibn Taghrībirdī reported that, in 
1452, a Muslim merchant filed a case against a Jewish merchant in the sharīʿah court. The core of 
the matter was that the Muslim merchant wanted to obtain a court order that would restrict the 
Jewish merchant from filing cases except before the sharīʿah courts. The chief qāḍī Walī al-Dīn al- 
Sūnbāty passed this verdict. The Jewish merchant refused to accept and said that he would submit a 
complaint. The chief qāḍī asked the translator to repeat the judgment, but the Jewish merchant 
refused to obey. The chief qāḍī got angry, so he tortured and imprisoned him. The Jewish merchant 
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submitted a complaint to sultan Jamāq who, when he heard the case rebuked the Malkī 
chief qāḍī and told him that “siyasāh runs the same course as the sharʿ” Ibn Taghrībirdī reported 
that the sultan overruled the judgment of the qāḍī and had him beaten. 382 This case shows that non-
Muslims resorted to siyāsah courts, and it developed a parallel jurisdiction to sharīʿah courts. 
The dawādār was one of the military officials whose jurisdiction expanded in the fifteenth 
century. The dawādār was responsible for the supervision of the scribes and chancery individuals. 
He was also responsible for official documents and an integral part of his duty was the postal 
service. The dawādār was in charge of foreign affairs and espionage.383 It is worthy of note that the 
dawādār interfered in the administration of justice since the time of Baḥrī Mamluks. Jørgen Nielsen 
asserts that the dawādār was one of the powerful military officials to the extent that his opinion 
could impact maẓālim cases. He was responsible as the ḥājib for presenting maẓālim petitions. 
Jørgen Nielsen argues that the power of the dawādār increased to the extent that he participated in 
the decision process of maẓālim cases and passed the verdicts to kātib al-sirr.384 According to al-
Qalqashandī, he was one of the channels of submitting maẓālim petitions to the sultan.385 A change 
happened between 1421 and 1422; the dawādār started to pass judgments over people.386 
Ibn al- Ṣayrafī reported this case towards the end of the fifteenth century that shows that 
the dawādār developed an effective jurisdiction over matrimonial cases. The maternal aunt of an 
orphan girl filed a petition to the chief Hanafī qāḍī Muḥibb al-Dīn banū al-Shiḥnah asking him to 
permit one of the qāḍīs, who by coincidence was Ibn al- Ṣayrafī who was a Hanfī deputy qāḍī, to 
marry off her niece to a good husband. Yossef Rapoport maintains that the aunt’s choice of the 
Ḥanafī school was because its the only school that allowed the qāḍī to marry off an orphan who was 
still a minor. After investigation, Ibn al- Ṣayrafī married the minor girl to a servant who worked at 
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one of the Royal Mamluks’ house. Ibn al- Ṣayrafī inserted a clause that forbids the groom from 
consummating the marriage until the wife reaches puberty. What happened was that the groom 
ignored this clause and consummated the marriage. In 1470, the girl asked for a divorce, which the 
husband refused to grant her unless she financially compensated him. The maternal aunt brought 
this case before the grand dawādār Yashbak. The grand dawādār brought the groom and Ibn al- 
Ṣayrafī in his court. He asked the qāḍī on what grounds did he marry this twelve-year-old girl. Ibn 
al- Ṣayrafī replied that he had done so based on the permission that he obtained from the person 
who appointed him to this post and the doctrine of his school. He also mentioned he has reviewed 
the evidence and was sure that the girl’s parents were absent. It seems that the 
grand dawādār Yashbak was not convinced with Ibn al- Ṣayrafī’s arguments, so he ordered that the 
husband had to be flogged less than one hundered lashes and humiliated. He also commended the 
divorce settlement must be reviewed by a Ḥanafī qāḍī. Based on the sharīʿah, the husband paid four 
gold coins to the wife.387 This case shows the expansion of the dawādār’s jurisdiction over 
matrimonial cases, which generally fell under the sharīʿah jurisdiction. It also reflects the way 
the siyāsah courts functioned and that they did not deliver arbitrary judgments. While the 
grand dawādār Yashbak applied siyāsah in his court, he referred the divorce to a Ḥanafī qāḍī.  
It seems that the dawādār continued to play the same role until the reign of Qāytbāy 
(r.1468-1496). Carl Petry maintains that the judicial authority of the dawādārs grew over time. 
Qāytbāy depended on them in the cases that were brought before him. One of the cases that Carl 
Petry cites was that two purchased Mamluks brought their case before the sultan, over an iqṭāʿ. 
When this case was brought before the sultan he ordered the dawādār to secretly arrest one of the 
julbān who belonged to the Inaliya crops.388 
 It appears that the public recognised the jurisdiction of the dawādār and considered them 
one of the channels of submitting complaints until the downfall of the sultanate. In 1516, a group of 
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peasants took one of the julbān, who was involved in the murder of a peasant, to the dawādār’s 
house. Even though the dawādār failed to protect the peasants because the recruiters threatened to 
burn his residence,389 this case is significant for two main reasons. It shows that the public 
recognised the dawādār as one of the channels of submitting maẓālim petitions. It is one of the 
many cases that reflect the amount of threat and injustice that the julbān posed.  
 The violations committed by these julbān started in the middle of the fifteenth century, 
earlier to this case. They interfered in the administration of justice and offered an alternative form 
of maẓālim. The justice offered by the julbān and the emergence of a new location for maẓālim, 
which was the platform (dikkah), were two interrelated developments in the institution in the middle 
of the fifteenth century. It is essential first to understand the background of the julbān to 
comprehend how they were able to interfere in the administration of justice and offer an alternative 
form of maẓālim. The julbān were the junior Mamluks, who were purchased at an old age. Their 
number increased during the reign of Barsbāy (r. 1422-1437), and they constantly revolted for 
either delay in payments or increase in stipend.390 They were one of the hardest factions that the 
sultan could control; they could infect the whole army with their revolts, and they committed 
disgraceful acts.391 Carl Petry argues that the sultanate’s leaders of invested large amounts of money 
in recruiting the julbān to maintain a self-sustained military system. It is essential to highlight that 
the military elite’s welfare was closely related to their economic and social dominance. Hence, they 
justified the consumption of the state resources for their benefit.392 The julbān were one of the 
groups that were inclined to violence, and they fuelled many of the riots that erupted during the 
reigns of Qāytbāy and al-Ghawrī. The violations that were committed bythe julbān were tolerable, 
but the problem accelerated when the regime failed to limit their actions and punish them. Although 
different sultans, including Qāytbāy, tried to punish them on multiple occasions, their power grew 
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beyond the regime’s capacity.393 Between 1456 and 1457, the sultan’s julbān offered a privatised 
form of justice, and settled legal disputes and received a sort of extortion in return from plaintiffs.394 
The julbān offered a form of justice that was parallel to the state’s maẓālim. While Mamluk sultans 
continued to preside over maẓālim personally, litigants had the option to bring their complaints 
before the julbān as well as siyāsah courts, which were led by the ḥujjāb. The major difference 
between the justice offered by the julbān and ḥujjāb was that the former were technically selling 
verdicts through the dikkak that were stationed in front of their households. At the same time, the 
latter functioned under the state’s authority and by the fifteenth century was considered one of the 
official channels of submitting maẓālim petitions. Ibn Taghrībirdī gave an account of the expansion 
of julbān’s jurisdictionduring the middle of sultan Īnāl’s reign and considered it one of the main 
reasons behind corruption. Ibn Taghrībirdī reported that during this year, people did not resort to the 
sharīʿah or siyāsah courts to settle their disputes because of the power of the julbān. Anyone who 
had a complaint knew that he could bring it before one of the julbān to guarantee that he would 
receive not a just verdict but a one that would satisfy him. The leading julbān had guards and 
dawādārs, who were stationed at their gates and were responsible for pursuing the defendants. The 
julbān passed verdicts that pleased the plaintiffs by intimidating the defendants; they tortured and 
punished them, if they refused to pay. Eventually, the dikkak that were stationed in front of the 
julbān’s households became one of the venues of justice. According to Ibn Taghrībirdī, the public 
decided to quit the sharīʿah, and siyāsah courts because of the presence of the julbān. This 
increased the authority of the julbān and their violations and weakened the authority of the main 
venues of justice, sharīʿah, and siyāsah.395   
 Technically, the julbān were selling verdicts, which Robert Irwin considered to be the 
“privatisation of justice.” 396 This could also be viewed as commercialisation of justice. The julbān 
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infringed some of the provisions of sharīʿah to gain financial benefits.397 This privatisation was 
marked by the spread of platforms (dikkak); many of the Mamluk elites had dikkak in front of their 
houses, which enabled them to pass judgments.398 In other words, the julbān offered an alternative 
maẓālim. This development did not offer access to justice but commercialised it. The state’s 
economic situation and its failure to meet the financial demands of this rebellious faction could be 
considered one of the primary reasons behind the emergence of this alternative maẓālim. Since the 
julbān were inclined to violence, it was very hard to limit their interference. In that respect, the state 
did not deliberately accept the commercialisation of justice by the julbān, but the economic crisis 
forced it to accept the decentralisation of various activities and the institutionalisation of these 
unlawful practices to survive. The state was forced to accept the commercialisation of justice to pay 
the julbān indirectly. This idea could be better understood when we consider the state’s policies 
during this period. This key development could be viewed as a part of a wider decentralisation trend 
that occurred in various institutions and was informed by the state’s economic and political 
conditions. According to John Meloy, justice was one of the services that the state failed to supply 
in the fifteenth century. During this period, various changes took place on the internal and external 
levels. Under the Circassian rule, some of the critical offices had undergone significant 
transformations. The authority of some of the critical offices was reduced, while others were 
eliminated or altered.399Amina El Bendary has argued that a militarisation process took place on 
multiple levels in the fifteenth century.400 Certain offices that were limited to civilians or ulama in 
administration became occupied by military officers. Various military officials worked as 
muḥtasibs, a post that was often limited to scholars and qāḍīs. Amina Elbendary points out that this 
was an indirect way to pay Mamluk amīrs with the collapse of the iqṭāʿ system; the muḥtasib was a 
lucrative position. This was one of the state’s attempts to find revenue sources for different Mamluk 
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factions.401 The same could apply to the justice offered by the julbān; selling verdicts was a 
lucrative business for them. The state was forced to accept it to pay the julbān indirectly. In general, 
according to John Meloy, the state accepted the decentralisation of its critical duties because of its 
financial situation. The julbān infringed some of the provisions of sharīʿah to gain financial 
benefits like the protectors.402 Protection (al-ḥimāyah) was also one of the state activities that were 
privatised. The ḥimāyah was imposed on different social groups: peasants, establishments, sugar 
presses, shops, and residence buildings. It was a practice that was not limited to specific economic 
activities and was widely spread in the fifteenth century.403 Although some sultans as Barsbāy and 
al- Ghawrī tried to limit the protectors’ authority, who threatened the whole system, they were hard 
to control.404 The same applies to the sale of public offices and the acceptance of bribes. In the 
fifteenth century, they became prevalent practices that the state had to accept to raise its revenue.405  
As Carl Petry rightly notes, fiscal corruption became public and was widely spread; even Qāytbāy, 
who was often praised for his justice by contemporary historians, sold offices to unqualified 
candidates. He accepted bribes from senior Mamluks and civilians. Al- Ghawrī also accepted bribes 
and promoted members of the administration and amīrs when he received them.406 Some 
individuals paid bribes to downsize their tax obligations; certain officials occupied more than one 
office. Dīwān officials performed various covert services in exchange for money.407 Furthermore, as 
Carl Petry argues, confiscation became central to the treasury during the Circassian period. Qāytbāy 
was often criticised for his confiscation strategy.408 Extraordinary taxes were levied to guarantee the 
troops’ loyalty, and subjects were forced to pay for state security. Carl Petry argues that a 
systematic process of appointment, dismissal, and restoration of officials occurred during the 
Circassian rule. From his standpoint, this process was covertly planned by the state as a sort of 
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income distribution to please different factions. Different sultans were forced to search for other 
sources of revenue as confiscation to raise revenue and please this factional network.409 In that 
respect, John Meloy argues that the institutionalisation of such practices did not take place because 
the state wanted to implement this policy but because it was forced to accept it.410 The financial 
status of the state was what forced it to accept specific actions such as private protection.411 
Different sultans were forced to search for other sources of revenue as confiscation to raise revenue 
and please various factions. John Meloy argues that the state did not deliberately and formally 
delegate some of its primary duties such as justice, protection, and ḥisba to other subordinates, but 
instead, it became very weak and had to accept this situation. In other words, it did not seek the 
instutionalization of such illegal acts, but it had to deal with it. The nature of the Mamluk system 
forced the sultan to accept these illegitimate acts to buy the loyalty of the Mamluks by offering 
them a continuous supply of cash and preserving their privileged status.412 Carl Petry asserts that 
the Mamluks were hired warriors, and their service was closely tied to the number of privileges they 
received and not inherited loyalty ties.413 They often threatened to revolt if their financial demands 
were not fulfilled. Towards the end of the Circassian period, the Mamluk sultans were left with very 
few options since they could not get rid of rebellious factions by recruiting new Mamluks because 
many Mamluks survived multiple reigns. Therefore, an arbitrary confiscation process took place, 
and chroniclers explained that these were the result of the pressure of the troops; the Mamluk elites 
believed that they had to be naturally privileged and that this was their right.414 Amina Elbendary 
argues that the interference of the Mamluks in the administration of justice was part of the 
militarisation process that was taking place on multiple levels. While in theory, the administration 
of justice and waqf were the ulama’s primary responsibility, by the fifteenth century, military 
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officials played a crucial role in the judicial life.415  In that respect, the interference of the julbān 
and other military officials in the administration of justice and mainly maẓālim was part of a 
broader trend of decentralisation and privitiazation of different state activities that were triggered by 
the economic and political conditions.  
 Although in the fifteenth century the process of submitting complaints was not only limited 
to the sultan or the siyāsah courts, with the interference of the jūlbans and other senior Mamluks in 
the administration of justice, Mamluk sultans remained very keen on personally presiding over 
maẓālim. In the middle of the fifteenth century, Mamluk sultans did not necessarily hold maẓālim 
sessions in the Royal Stables, but the dikkah (platform), located at the sultan’s park (ḥawsh) became 
the leading site of maẓālim. This change in maẓālim location underscores the competition that was 
present over the administration of justice. By the second half of the fifteenth century, there were 
two types of dikkak, one which belonged to the public sector and was led by the sultan. The other 
was led by the julbān, and litigants had the right to decide to which sector they wanted to take their 
case. This innovation probably appeared in the period following Barsbāy’s rule; maẓālim sessions 
were held at this new location.416  In general, it seems that the ḥawsh acquired significant 
importance in the middle of the fifteenth century and became the main site of ceremonial events. 
According to Ibn Taghrībirdī, sultan Īnāl abolished the khidma that took place in the palace and 
used to sit in the ḥawsh al-sultani for ceremonial events.417 In 1461, sultan Khushqdam (r.1461-
1467) encouraged the public to come with their complaints to maẓālim and held his sessions at the 
dikkah also, but occasionally he used the Royal Stables. Although Qāytbāy invested immense 
amounts of money in restoring the īwān, it seems that he continued using the dikkah for maẓālim in 
Summer and the Royal Stables in Winter.418 Al-Ghawrī revived the long-standing tradition of 
Mamluk sultans and held maẓālim at the dikkah, which was located inside the citadel. Al- Ghawrī 
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renovated this location, decorated it with marble and gold, and curved his name. It was more 
extravagant than anything else, not meeting the needs of the litigants.419 Although al- Ghawrī tried 
to restrict the presence of dikkak in front of the Mamluk elites’ houses in 1505 and between 1513 
and 1514, he failed to do this under the pressure of the senior amīrs, who refused to lose this 
revenue.420  The presence of the dikkak in the streets of Cairo and the way Mamluk elites 
administered justice and imposed very high financial penalties on litigants represented what Robert 
Irwin called “the privatisation of justice.” Although the interference of the julbān and other military 
officials in maẓālim could reflect access to justice, it confused it.  Amina ElBendery points out that 
this transformation allowed the Mamluks to exercise more power over the public, negatively 
impacting all society segments.421 It also created a sort of competition over justice. Mamluk sultans 
competed with the julbān and other Mamluk elites for the administration of justice. The presence of 
two types of dikkak may highlight this.  
 Under these very pressing economic, political, and social conditions and the decentralisation 
of various state activities, Mamluk sultans continued to utilise their appellate power to consolidate 
their legitimacy and project a positive public image. However, it is very hard to construct the 
sultan’s image, especially in the sultanate’s last decades. Historians provide contradicting images of 
the same sultans. Albrecht Fuess argues that Qāytbāy appears as a just ruler in the contemporary 
sources, while in reality, he violated the sharīʿah through maẓālim and many of his actions were 
considered a sort of “show off.” Although Jonathan Berkey asserts that al- Ghawrī acknowledged 
the significance of this supreme judicial authority that was assigned to him through maẓālim, 
Albrecht Fuess argues that Sultan al- Ghawrī was unjust and  none could object during his reign or 
file a case against one of his favourites.422 Sultan Qāytbāy projected himself as the supporter of the 
orphans, widows, and helpless people.423 Jonathan Berkey argues that Mamluk sultans were 
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concerned about the judicial responsibility of maẓālim. As a result, they had created a very 
bureaucratic process for maẓālim, which the sultan and his subordinates abided by.424 This shows to 
what extent maẓālim was very crucial to Mamluk sultans. The majority of the Mamluk sultans were 
interested in personally supervising maẓālim except for the rulers whose reigns were very short or 
were minors. In the viewpoint of Jonathan Berkey, Qāytbāy was one of the rulers who utilised 
maẓālim in a brilliant way and enjoyed a very good reputation among the public; he was known for 
his justice. Although his relationship with the religious establishment was characterised by tension, 
he gained acceptance by his commitment to justice and Sunni Islam. The maẓālim under the 
Mamluks was considered one of the important public events that various sultans were always keen 
on. Maẓālim was an integral part of the Mamluks’ ruling ideology as it consolidated their 
legitimacy and allowed them to project the image of just rulers. 
 In conclusion, in the fifteenth century, the power dynamics dramatically changed, and non- 
dynastic rule became the tradition. The sultan attained the throne based on the elections, and he 
belonged and represented the victorious faction. In that respect, as Amalia Levanoni argues, the 
sultan’s dependence on his Mamluks increased, and attaining the throne was bound to them. 425 Carl 
Petry agrees with Amalia Levanoni that in the fifteenth century, the nature of the Mamluk system, 
which capitalised on factional ties and informal relations, manifested. While the Mamluk oligarchy 
was often driven with interest, in the fifteenth century, one of the sultan’s main goals was to please 
the Mamluk elites by allowing them to harvest revenue and secure their interest during the 
economic decline.426 One of the distinct traits that distinguished the Circassian’s rule from the 
Baḥrī, according to Amalia Levanoni, was that the sultan could not act like an autocratic rule 
without considering the will and the interest of various factions.  Although the founders of this new 
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regime tried to restore the sultan’s power, two distinct traits distinguished the Circassian’s rule. In 
the viewpoint of John Meloy, the first was the ability of political elites to utilised the state’s 
ineffectiveness during the economic crisis.427 The second was as Amina Elbendary argues that 
although the fifteenth century was a crisis period, it posed opportunities for different social and 
political factions. From her standpoint, the fifteenth century was a period of economic crisis and 
political transformations that offered new social groups more power and made others suffer.428  On 
the other hand, John Meloy argues that the state’s economic stagnation resulted in policies that 
harmed both the state and society.429 This problem of lands that were transferred into waqf was one 
of these examples. John Meloy asserts that the economic stagnation that the Mamluk sultanate 
experienced altered the political dynamics, which made the primary objective of the sultan and his 
administration was to encounter the economic crisis while protecting their personal interest.430 This 
forced the state to take various measurements, which dramatically impacted various institutions. 
This may explain the privatisation of different state activities and significant changes in various 
institutions. These crucial transformations led to the commercialisation of justice, and maẓālim was 
one of the institutions dramatically impacted by these changes. In the fifteenth century, the 
institution of maẓālim became less structured, and the service it provided became offered by other 
entities. The decentralised policy that the state adopted during this period created a competition 
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 This thesis has tried to highlight the place of maẓālim in the Mamluk state. It tried to look 
at maẓālim as part of a particular political, economic, and social narrative to understand the extent 
to which the institution was politically utilized. This thesis has focused on moments of change in 
the history of Mamluk maẓālim: 1262,1353, 1387, and 1457. The first moment of change was in 
1262 when Baybars decided to establish a new dār al-ʿadl and restructure the institution. The 
second major transformation in maẓālim was between 1352 and 1353. The expansion of 
the ḥājib jurisdiction and the emergence of a new form of justice called siyāsah courts marked it. 
The movement of maẓālim in 1387 by sultan Barqūq to Royal Stables was the third critical 
development in the institution. Barqūq tried to bring the institution under the sultanic overview and 
modified maẓālim protocol. The last moment of change was between 1456 and 1457; it was the 
justice offered by the julbān. This led to the institution’s decentralization as the julbān offered an 
alternative form of maẓālim and obtained a sort of extortion in return from plaintiffs. Although 
there was a degree of continuity, as each chapter tried to show, there were critical moments of 
change. This thesis tried to look at the significant transformations in the institution and proposed 
reasons for such developments. In that sense, this thesis has argued that the Mamluks politically 
utilized maẓālim to achieve broader objectives. These goals were often triggered by pressing 
political, economic, and social conditions. The Mamluks relied on this institution to introduce 
significant developments that impacted the legal system, such as the quadruple legal system and the 
siyāsah courts. Furthermore, this thesis has argued that maẓālim remained an integral part of 
legitimacy for Mamluk sultans. This was mainly attributed to the institution’s nature, which made 
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holding maẓālim sessions a sign of sovereignty and a way for the ruler to project a positive public 
image. The idea of appearing as just rulers was central to various Mamluk sultans. A just ruler is a 
legitimate ruler. This may explain why Mamluk sultans were often keen on regularly 
holding maẓālim sessions. Furthermore, the institution enabled different Mamluk sultans to 
introduce innovations that impacted the legal system without harming their public image.  
           In each phase, the objectives and the needs of the regime were slightly different. In the 
period of state formation (1260-1341), one of the primary goals of the Mamluks was to consolidate 
their legitimacy. Maẓālim was one of the leading institutions that the Mamluks relied on to 
consolidate their legitimacy. Baybar, Qalāwūn, and al-Nāṣir Muḥammad considered maẓālim an 
integral part of the administration. This may explain why they created a particular venue for it, such 
as dār al-ʿadl, considered maẓālim sessions a public event and established a detailed bureaucratic 
process. This institutionalization was intended to project a positive public image and introduce 
major legal innovations such as the quadruple legal system.  
           As we have seen, with the death of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, the state entered a new phase of 
political, economic, and social instability. Myriad factors contributed to this situation. The weak 
rule of the Qalāwūnid house and struggles between factional powers were among the main reasons 
for political instability. Furthermore, the recurring waves of the plague harmed the economy and 
society. The very high mortality rates affected both the army and workforce. The second half of the 
fourteenth century became a period of crisis. During this period, the Mamluks politically 
utilized maẓālim and expanded the role of the ḥājib. Maẓālim was used to legitimise the emergence 
of a new form of justice known by the siyāsah courts. This form of justice was concentrated in the 
hands of political and not religious authorities. The reason behind this transformation was the will 
of political authorities to have a greater say in judicial matters during the economic crisis, along 
with their constant need for legitimisation. The Mamluks used maẓālim to introduce this form of 
justice without harming their public image. 
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           Although by the rise of the Circasssion Mamluks siyāsah courts were considered one of the 
main venues of justice, a new challenge appeared with the state’s declining financial condition. This 
was the issue of land management, which urged Barqūq to bring maẓālim under sultanic overview. 
Barqūq utilized maẓālim to diminish the amīrs’ power over agricultural lands by encouraging a new 
audience to his sessions and changing maẓālim protocol. However, starting in the second half of the 
fifteenth century, the institution became less structured and decentralized with the interference of 
the julbān in the administration of justice. The julbān offered an alternative form of maẓālim, which 
led to the commercialization of justice. This was part of a broader trend of decentralization that the 
state had to accept to survive.  
Maẓālim was one of the leading institutions that the Mamluks relied on. The theory of al-
Māwardī gave great value to the institution and glorified it in various rulers’ eyes. Maẓālim was 
often considered a sign of sovereignty and an articulation of his legitimacy. This was one of the 
primary reasons the Mamluks utilized the institution politically. The Mamluks did not use maẓālim 
to override the sharīʿah but pressing political, economic, and social conditions that they 
experienced forced them to utilize the institution.  
The Mamluks tried to follow the theory of al-Māwardī, but they had particular 
circumstances, which made the institution function differently. Although Jørgen Nielsen, in his 
exceptional monograph, considered maẓālim a secular justice, this distinction is controversial. 
Viewing maẓālim as either secular or religious justice limits our understanding of the institution. 
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